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Um dos desenvolvimentos mais interessantes no panorama político 
contemporâneo é a articulação entre a política e o entretenimento. Utilizando uma 
metodologia experimental, esta dissertação pretende estudar os efeitos que 
exposição a dramas de ficção política tem na audiência, quer no seu nível de 
eficácia política, nas atitudes para com os partidos e na confiança em instituições 
políticas. Foi possível confirmar parcialmente quatro das seis hipóteses. 
Estabeleceu-se uma relação entre a exposição a dramas de ficção política e 
mudança de atitudes políticas, sendo que a exposição a este tipo de 
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One of the most interesting developments in the contemporary political 
landscape is the articulation between entertainment and politics. Through 
experimental methodology, this dissertation aims to analyse the effects of 
exposure to political fictional dramas on attitudes such as political efficacy, 
attitudes towards political parties and trust in political institutions.  Four of our 
six hypotheses were partially confirmed by our experiment. We established a 
relationship between exposure to political fictional dramas and changes in 
political attitudes, being that the impact of this type of politically themed 
entertainment was most strongly felt at the level of the external political efficacy 
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One of the most interesting features of late twentieth-century and early twenty-
first century politics is its convergence with popular culture. Since Hollywood B-movie 
actor Ronald Reagan’s presidential victory we have witnessed professional wrestler 
Jesse Ventura become governor of the state of Minnesota in 1999 and Austrian-born 
action movie star and bodybuilder Arnold Schwarzenegger win California’s 
gubernatorial seat in 2003, having announced his candidacy in The Tonight Show 
With Jay Leno. Many high-profile Hollywood actors and filmmakers make financial 
contributions to US presidential campaigns while not shying away from making such 
contributions public, thus generating publicity for their candidate of choice. Recently, 
and more notoriously, we can point out the appearance of United States President 
Barack Obama on the internet comedy show Between Two Ferns with Zack 
Galifianakis and on the satirical The Colbert Report. In the latter, Barack Obama 
actively participates in the show’s comedy when, seemingly tired of Stephen Colbert’s 
political lampooning, he takes over for the host in one of the show’s segments. The 
last two examples are important because they show, on the part of the United States 
presidency, an acute awareness of the popular culture zeitgeist. 
In fact, one can argue that with the advent of television in the post-war period as 
a tool used by political parties in their political campaigns, politicians had to become 
celebrities. Political parties could no longer rely on the old cleavages they represented 
such as the proletariat, the bourgeoisie or particular religious-ethnic identities (Lipset 
& Rokkan 1967). As Van Zoonen (2005) puts forward, politics became extremely 
personalized in the context of an entertainment-soaked culture due to three political 
and cultural circumstances. The first is the increased focus on the individual traits of 
politicians as opposed to political programs, due to an effort on the part of the 
citizens to minimize the time spent on learning about politics. The second is that 
entertainment culture provides a framework that gives greater importance to 
individuals, psychological motives and personal efficiency over processes, power 
structures and abstract social developments. Both circumstances result in the third: 
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the constant need for politicians to travel between politics and entertainment in order 
to maintain their status and to remain relevant to their constituencies.  
As Jackson (2009) argues, the way young people think about politics has also 
changed dramatically. Nowadays young people think of politics in more lifestyle and 
personalistic ways; politics have become more about lifestyle choices, tolerance, 
sexual and gender identity, and environmental concerns. This has resulted in an 
abandonment of  
traditional kinds of political participation (voting in particular) in favor of more direct, 
volunteer activity because they can see directly the results of their activity. This is one 
of the reasons why the environmental movement has exerted such pull on this 
generation. One need not join a group or participate in a protest to become an 
environmentalist. All one needs to do is recycle one’s trash – certainly an individual 
activity with direct results  
Clymer in Jackson (2009, p. 52). 
Despite this predicament, political science scholarship concerning popular culture 
and its effects on the polity and on political attitudes is still at its first stage. As 
Jackson (2009) and Van Zoonen (2007) argue, political science has overlooked 
popular culture as a field of study.  
Van Zoonen points out that the dismissal of popular culture by researchers and 
scholars is rooted in a historical disdain for the entertainment industries and their 
possible articulations with politics. Citing a diverse set of scholars from Neil Postman, 
Pierre Bourdieu and Jürgen Habermas among others, Van Zoonen identifies the thesis 
behind this dismissal, which she labels the video malaise. The phenomenon is 
summarized by the author as a pervasive influence of television on political discourse, 
characterized by an increased tendency to simplify, sentimentalize and to 
conceptualize in a more personalistic way what previously was a “purely 
informational, rational, and deliberative” discourse (2005, p. 2).  
According to Van Zoonen, this segregation between politics and popular culture 
can be explained by their distinct origins. Popular culture is rooted in oral traditions 
and folklore, while politics owes its evolution to literacy and modernity, and as the 
author further elaborates, this distinction carries with it asymmetric power relations 
and elite dominance (Van Zoonen 2005). Van Zoonen warns that if the political 
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sphere continues to pursue this disdain it risks alienating the contemporary citizen, as 
politics is forced to compete with other activities for citizens’ attention:  
Keeping up with politics by reading the newspaper has to be secured from other 
reading […]. Keeping up with politics by watching the relevant television programs is 
in competition with sports, comedies, or quiz shows. Visiting a political demonstration 
is in conflict with going to a simultaneously scheduled classic car fair.  
Van Zoonen (2005, p. 2) 
In Portugal there are many instances where entertainment and politics have met 
which have been recently studied by Santana Pereira (2016). For instance, it is 
customary for politicians on the campaign trail to be interviewed in late-night talk 
shows such as Herman SIC (2000-2006) or in 5 Para a Meia-Noite (2009-present). In a 
different register, less comedic but nonetheless familial and causal, there have been 
politicians who have appeared to be interview in Alta Definição (2009-present), an 
interview show produced for SIC. The Portuguese television industry has even 
produced its own version of the Daily Show hosted by Portuguese funny men Gato 
Fedorento with the shows Gato Fedorento Esmiuça os Sufragios (2009) and Isso é 
Tudo Bonito, Mas (2015) wherein the group of comedians covered the 2009 and 
2015 legislative elections in Portugal. The show featured many politically themed 
satirical sketches and interviews with the main figureheads of the parties running for 
parliament. Another example of political satire in Portugal was the long-running 
puppet show aired by RTP Contra Informação (1996-2010). Relative to fiction, the 
offer is relatively lesser in quantity. An example are the situational comedies A 
Senhora Ministra (2000) and A Mãe do Senhor Ministro (2013). 
However, this phenomenon has been scarcely studied in Portugal; there have 
been studies conducted that look at the articulation between entertainment and 
politics in Portugal. Deodato (2013) analyses the main themes of the Portuguese 
satirical television shows Diz que é uma Espécie de Magazine and Os 
Contemporâneos. The study finds that these shows’ satirical messages stick to the 
Portuguese social reality and usually avoid discussing international politics and rely on 
comedic strategies which ridicularize political actors on the national scene as being 
corrupt and motivated by self-interest. In a similar study, Pardal (2015) critically assess 
the Portuguese satirical talk-show Governo Sombra. For the author, the political 
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comedic content the show is known for is crucial in destabilizing hegemonic 
conceptions of Portuguese politics through the use of satire. This is in line with 
Holbert (2013) who argues in favor of the normative role of political satire in 
democracy, through its ability to expose those in power. In view of these recent 
studies, our own distinguishes itself by focusing on the effects of entertainment 
rather than on the content of entertainment media. 
The present research hopes bridge this gap by contributing to a growing field of 
scholarship, by probing into a seldom tapped, in Jackson’s words, goldmine. More 
specifically the effects, if any, of fictional politically themed television entertainment 
content, on the people who watch it. To be even more accurate, the present research 
is going to answer the following research question: What are the effects of exposure 
to fictional political dramas on the audience’s political attitudes? In other words, are 
people’s attitudes toward politicians influenced by the television entertainment 
content they consume? In the present research, fictional politically themed television 
entertainment content is to be understood as drama series where politicians are 
heavily featured or are indeed the main focus of the narrative. In this study we used 
The West Wing (1999-2006) and House of Cards (US 2013-present). The choice of 
American dramas was made not only because these shows are/were very popular in 
Portugal, but also because there is no national production of political fiction in the 
country suitable for the needs of our study. For the purpose of answering the 
research question that anchors this research, an experimental design, which is 
outlined in Chapter 3, was employed. It is important to note that while the sample of 
participants that was used in our experiment consisted of Portuguese university 
students, the television series used in the treatment were produced and aimed at 
portraying the United States political reality is which substantially different from that 
of Portugal. Therefore, this strikes us as being a considerably harsh setting for the test 
of hypotheses concerning effects of political dramas on attitudes towards politics. If 
effects were to be seen, this would be proof of the power of political entertainment 
contents.  
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As will be shown, we were able to observe that there is indeed a relationship 
between exposure to fictional political dramas and a change in political attitudes such 
as political efficacy, attitudes towards politicians and trust in political institutions, 
which partially confirms our hypotheses. 
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the literature on 
entertainment and politics, focusing on the effects of the former on citizens’ attitudes 
towards the latter. It begins with an exploration of four of the most often used 
theories to explain how our attitudes are shaped by the media we are exposed to, 
namely cultivation theory, agenda-setting, priming, and finally framing which, of the 
four is the most relevant to our study. It then reviews the literature studying the 
effects of media exposure on political attitudes. Chapter 3 details the hypotheses 
which were tested in the experimental design, as well as outlines the thesis’ research 
design and methodology. Before testing the hypothesis, a detailed description of the 
sample of university students who participated in this study is presented, in Chapter 
4. This is followed by the presentation of the results of our experiment and its 






2. RESEARCH ON ENTERTAINMENT AND POLITICS: A 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this chapter, we will identify and present the relevant literature for this thesis. 
The chapter is divided into two blocks: the first one (2.1) is an exploration of four 
central theories of media studies: cultivation theory, agenda-setting, priming and to a 
more elaborate degree, an overview of framing and why it is the model that best 
suits the present research. 
In the second block (2.2 & 2.3), we will follow Holbert’s (2005) typology on the 
multiple forms that politically themed television content can assume. The author 
identifies nine categories of entertainment television which provide opportunities for 
the framing of the political process. Following from here, I will present a review of 
significant studies on the effects of non-fictional entertainment media, such as talk-
shows, reality shows and news programming, and more pertinently, fictional 
entertainment media. on political attitudes  
It is important to survey what the literature tells us about the issue so that we 
can more effectively contribute to this growing body of research. In general, the 
literature gives evidence that media exposure is associated with attitude change. This 
is relevant in so far as it provides support for our research aims and methodology. 
 
2.1. Cognitive effects of mass media use and cultivation theory 
Researchers in the social sciences have studied the effects of mass media on 
society in the past, and to a lesser extent, popular culture. In Scheufele and 
Tewksbury’s article (2007), four theoretical models for the study of media are 
identified: cultivation theory, agenda setting, priming, and framing. 
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2.1.1. Cultivation Theory 
Cultivation theory aims at studying the effects of television viewing in the 
process of socialization. As Gerbner (1998) argues, television has largely substituted 
oral and other forms of communicating the narratives that structure our lives through 
a coherent system of images and messages which “cultivates from infancy 
predispositions and preferences” (p. 177). Morgan and Shanahan (2010) summarize 
the theory thusly: “those who spend more time watching television are more likely to 
perceive the real world in ways that reflect the most common and recurrent 
messages of the world of fictional television”. (2010 p. 337).  
For Gerbner (1998), cultivation analysis begins with a systematic analysis of the 
most recurrent thematic patterns provided by television. The author points out, that 
while testing for cultivation effects with short-term exposure might potentially 
produce effects, the theoretical assumption of cultivation theory are more ambitious 
and pertain to repetitive, long-term and consistent patterns of mass media exposure.  
Considering the long-term nature of cultivation analysis and the time constraints 
of our research design (see Chapter 3), we speculate that there won’t be the 
necessary time of exposure to produce cultivation effects. Nonetheless, it is important 
to recognize the theory as a broader analysis of the political effects of media in 
general, and of entertainment television more specifically. 
 
2.1.2. Agenda setting and priming 
Agenda setting is the theory that defends that the mass media and other bodies 
and structures in the polity such as the corporate world, religious and educations 
institutions (McCombs 2006), or even the executive dimension of the government, 
which is argued by Rutledge and Price (2014), set and define the topics that the 
public at large considers to be important.  
Priming, which Scheufele and Tewksbury points out “is often understood as an 
extension of agenda setting” (2007, p.11), focuses on the importance certain topics 
are given in mass media and how these selected topics become the gauge with 
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which they assess the performance of the government, for example. Both these 
models share common assumptions according to Scheufele and Tewksbury. The 
underlying theory is that people use the salience of any given issue to construct 
attitudes and arrive at decisions. In sum: “By making some issues more salient in 
people’s mind (agenda setting), mass media can also shape the considerations that 
people take into account when making judgments about political candidates or issues 
(priming)” (Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007, p.11).  
 
2.1.3. Framing 
Finally, framing, which as Van Gorp (2007) reports has become the paradigmatic 
research avenue in communication studies, is characterized by the premise that the 
way a particular topic is presented to the audience will influence the way it is 
received. The theory of framing is traced back by Scheufele and Tewksbury to the 
experimental work of Kahneman and Tversky and their Asian Disease experiment 
(1983). The authors created the hypothetical scenario to measure risk aversion where 
an epidemic disease, which is believed to kill 600 people, occurs and the government 
is expected to tackle the problem. Four alternative solutions to the problem are 
proposed (Kahneman & Tversky 1983). Participants in Kahneman and Tversky’s 
research were asked to choose between these four options. The researchers 
discovered that even though all the options given to the participants in the 
experiment were interchangeable in content but not in presentation, participants 
altered their choices depending on the more positive or negative formulation of the 
options.  
In Scheufele and Tewksbury’s account of framing, the theory has both a 
macrolevel, associated with Kahneman and Tversky where, has it has been shown, 
“different presentations of essentially identical decision-making scenarios influence 
people’s choices and their evaluation of the various options presented to them” 
(Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007, p.11), and a microlevel. Using Goffman as a reference 
point, Scheufele and Tewksbury identify the microlevel with the assumed inability of 
individuals to fully comprehend the world around them and therefore, individuals 
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have to “apply interpretive schemas or ‘primary frameworks’ to classify information 
and interpret it meaningfully” (Goffman in Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007, p. 12).  In 
sum, according to Scheufele and Tewksbury,  
as a macroconstruct, the term “framing” refers to modes of presentation that 
journalists and other communicators use to present information in a way that 
resonates with existing underlying schemas among their audience […]. As a 
microconstruct, framing describes how people use information and presentation 
features regarding issues as they form impressions. 
Scheufele & Tewksbury (2007, p. 12) 
De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2003) add another dimension to the theory of 
framing by pointing out that often certain issues can be framed with either a clear 
positive or negative element, which the authors describe as valence framing. For 
example, news organizations might frame the recent refugee crises as either a 
humanitarian crisis that needs to be tackled, wherein the refugees are seen as victims 
running for their lives in the awake of a brutal armed conflict at home, or the issue 
can be framed as an organized invasion of Europe by Muslims seeking to take 
advantage of its generous welfare programs. Each of these frames carries with them 
a clear good/bad, positive/negative valence.  
Through the content analysis of a cross-national sample of 717 newspaper and 
television news stories and a subsequent experimental design, De Vreese and 
Boomgaarden (2003) test the effects of the valenced news frames of the European 
Union summit. In the content analysis, the researchers found out that news outlets 
across the three sampled countries (Great Britain, Germany and the Netherlands) 
framed the issue of European integration and enlargement as being disadvantageous 
and that framing was homogenous across these countries (De Vreese & 
Boomgaarden 2003, p. 373). In the experimental design, university students were 
randomly assigned to two different experimental groups, one to be exposed to an 
advantageous framing of European integration and enlargement, while the other 
group was exposed to a negative framing of the issue. They discovered that those 
exposed to the disadvantageous framing displayed a more negative outlook towards 
European Union enlargement and less support for the EU in relation with those 
exposed to the advantageous framing (De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2003, p. 376). 
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In another study of valenced news frames, De Vreese et al (2011) employ an 
experimental design to test the effects of valenced news framing on attitudes 
towards Turkish membership in the European Union. They observed that different 
framing of the issue had a relationship with attitude change and that the impact of 
negative framing was greater than the impact of positive framing, which is in line 
with De Vreese & Boomgaarden (2003). 
This notion of valence framing can be extended to fictional representations of 
politics on television. A script writer might frame the political process as something 
that is carried out by a group of principled individuals who have the best interests of 
the citizenry at heart; or as something that is done by ambitious power players whose 
objective is the maximization of their own power and status often in conflict with the 
interests of the population at large. That is the aim of this study: to analyze the 
effects of valenced framing of politicians in fictional political dramas and the effects 
produced in the audience. 
 
2.2. Typology of political entertainment   
In order to better understand the multiple forms that political entertainment can 
take shape in our television landscape, Holbert (2005) develops a typology for the 
study of the intersection between entertainment television and politics. For Holbert, a 
typology such as this one is useful as a way to organize research in a new field like 
the intersection between entertainment and politics. Secondly, it highlights where 
research in the field is more advanced and where it is lacking. Another important 
aspect is that, even though a typology such as this one servers to draw lines in a map, 
so to speak, regarding the multiple types and genres of entertainment media 
connected with politics, it also serves to interconnect them. As Holbert puts it, “no 
one content type contained in the typology functions in a vacuum” (Holbert 2005, p. 
448). The nine categories of Holbert’s typology are traditional satire, situation 
comedy satire, lifeworld content, fictional political dramas, political docudramas, 
reality-based content, and entertainment talk show interviews with politicians, soft 
news and entertainment television events, which we develop next. The reason we 
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have singled out fictional political into its own subsection pertains to the fact that our 
focus in this study is to look at the effects of exposure to fictional political dramas in 
the audience’s political attitudes. We improved upon Holbert’s typology by including 
into it a contribution made by Van Zoonen and Wring (2012) who identify another 
genre of politically themed entertainment television; the political thriller. This genre of 
television was included within Holbert’s fictional political drama category since both 
genres share similar themes.  
The first category in Holbert’s typology is entertainment television events, which 
is usually entertainment coverage of events like awards ceremonies. According to 
Holbert, these programs “often communicates explicit political statements” such as 
more government funding for the arts, or criticisms of American foreign policy “but 
these statements make up a minor portion of a program and are not expected to be 
anything but secondary relative to the program’s overall entertainment value” 
(Holbert 2005, p. 48). 
Situation comedy satire is defined by television shows, which follow a narrative 
and are comedic in nature. This type of content does not rely in political commentary 
but nonetheless, viewers usually expect elements of political satire and comedic 
commentary in the show’s runtime. According to Holbert, The Simpsons and South 
Park are prime examples of the situation comedy satire category (p. 444).  
In Van Zoonen and Wring’s historical analysis of the key trends in political 
television fiction in the United Kingdom (2012), three general frames have been 
identified in relation to the production of fictional representations of politicians in the 
UK, which offer the audience “potentially engaging qualities” (Van Zoonen & Wring 
2012, p. 5). As the authors concede, “the quest and soap narrative offer specific 
possibilities for engagement, whereas conspiracy and bureaucracy are more likely to 
invite disengagement” (Van Zoonen & Wring 2012, p. 5). These three frames also 
coincide with three broad genres of entertainment: comedies, thrillers and dramas. In 
the comedy frame, Van Zoonen and Wring identify Yes Minister, its sequel, Yes Prime 
Minister, The New Statesman and The Thick of It. Politicians in these programs are 
often represented as “dim-witted, lazy and uncooperative at best, and as malign, 
 23 
manipulative and obsessed at worst” (Van Zoonen & Wring 2012, p. 8). A running 
theme identified by the authors in the comedy frame is the rigid bureaucracy that the 
characters find themselves immersed in, where “failure and derision are their 
inevitable fate” (Van Zoonen & Wring 2012, p. 8). The theme of self-interest 
motivation is also present. 
The third category in Holbert’s typology is lifeworld content, characterized by 
dramas or comedies dealing with individuals faced with challenging circumstances 
such as dealing with tough economic situations, health care related issues and so on. 
An example of this type of television content are some of the made-for-TV films 
produced for the Lifetime Channel in the United States. According to Holbert,  
audiences do not turn to these programs for their socio-political statements. […] 
Nonetheless, extant critical/cultural scholarship, cultivation-based inquiries, and more 
traditional media effects-based research all point to popular forms of prime-time 
entertainment television programming providing an audience with socio-political 
information, and that lifeworld content has the potential to influence public opinion 
concerning a range of issues  
Holbert (2005 p. 445) 
The fourth category is political docudramas. This genre of television content is 
very similar to the lifeworld content but with a greater focus on political issues: 
“these stories often focus on a particular set of individuals or a community dealing 
with a crisis, but the teleplays also present what are inherently political issues that 
involve citizens engaging public officials or some interaction between competing 
public versus private interests” (Holbert 2005, p. 446). Examples of this genre are The 
Road to Guantánamo (2006) produced for Channel 4 or Game Change (2008) 
produced by HBO. But unlike fictional political dramas, political docudramas are not 
set in political contexts like the White House as in The West Wing or Congress like 
the North American version of House of Cards.  
The fifth category in Holbert’s typology is soft news. This type of entertainment 
news programs is usually dedicated to celebrity gossip and other entertainment 
industry related news stories, examples of this type of television can be found in 
Portugal such as Fama Show aired in SIC or Caras em Destaque aired in SIC Caras. In 
spite of this, Holbert points out that there is empirical evidence that people who tune 
 24 
in these news programs will be indirectly exposed to political information through 
them: “audience members do not turn to Entertainment Tonight primarily for public 
affairs information, but it is clear that viewers of this type of programming will gain 
access to this content type during the course of the mass communication 
consumption process” (Holbert 2005, p. 448). 
The sixth category is entertainment talk show interviews with politicians. 
Examples of this type of television content can be found in Portugal, like we have 
referenced in Chapter 1, Herman SIC and 5 Para a Meia Noite, often featured 
appearances and casual interviews with Portuguese politicians such as António Costa 
or Catarina Martins. As Holbert argues, this type of television program has become a 
part of the public debate; for example, during the Portuguese 2009 legislative and 
local elections a satirical news program inspired by the Daily Show with Jon Stewart, 
called Gato Fedorento Esmiúça os Sufrágios interviewed all the front runners of the 
major political parties (Santana Pereira 2016). The example could be problematic 
since the show did not strictly follow the talk show format, but it is relevant inasmuch 
as it shows the need for politicians to engage in entertainment formats. As Holbert 
points out, “audience members have come to expect political topics to be dominant 
when public officials are guests on entertainment talk shows” (Holbert 2005, p. 447). 
The seventh category in Holbert’s typology is reality-based content, or in other 
words, reality television such as Big Brother or COPS. Holbert includes documentaries 
in this category, giving the example of nature documentaries to defend this addition, 
as he argues that often these documentaries make explicit statements about 
environmental protection, which have political implications. Despite this, Holbert 
points out that political statements are not the driving force behind these television 
programs, but “there is a mix of explicit and implicit socio-political statements being 
offered beyond the entertainment value” (Holbert 2005, p. 447). 
Holbert’s eighth category is traditional satire, defining this type of entertainment 
content as comedic in nature and offering social and political commentary. Thus, 
although these shows do not “provide explicit statements of political fact, […] 
political messages provided through these outlets are predominately implied by the 
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very nature of their being grounded in humor” (Holbert 2005, pp, 444). Examples of 
this type of content are the political sketches in comedy shows like Saturday Night 
Live or the opening monologues in comedic talk shows like the Late Show with David 
Letterman.  
Holbert (2013) outlines a normative approach to political satire in which three 
types of democratic regimes, republican, pluralist and elitist, are set against political 
satire’s normative value.  
Within republicanism, Holbert identifies three normative roles of political 
communication: promotion of civic virtue; exposing corruption and ulterior motives of 
political agents; and the development of a space in which the public debate of ideas 
can take place (Holbert 2013, p. 312). Regarding the first role of political 
communication within a republican framework, Holbert points out two contradictory 
tendencies: the first is that political satire might increase cynicism in the citizenry but, 
on the other hand, political satire might serve to promote critical thinking. Holbert 
concedes that there is little empirical evidence to support either claims (2013, p. 312). 
In the second role, political satire is far more conclusive. Holbert points out that one 
of the main aims of satire is to expose human folly. As such, political satire plays an 
important role in the exposure of corruption and of the possible ulterior motivations 
of political agents. In the third role, political satire fills the space in more ambiguous 
ways. Coming from Althaus, Holbert identifies the republican ideal of a space for the 
debate of ideas that is informed, objective and inclusive. Objectivity for the political 
satirist is different to the objectivity required from a journalist, as Holbert points out. 
In order for the satirist to be objective, he must see “all who are in power as equally 
worthy of satirical ridicule” (Feinberg in Holbert 2013, p. 312). Holbert cites empirical 
evidence that shows satirists like Jon Stewart are more likely to target Republicans 
than Democrats but an attentive viewing of the Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show will 
attest that both sides of the American political party system have suffered from his 
satirical wit. As for political satire’s claim for inclusivity, Holbert argues, “Given the 
complexities of political satire as a message style, it is, arguably, far from inclusive” 
(2013, p. 313). 
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The normative role allotted to political communication within a pluralistic 
democracy is, according to Holbert, threefold: the first role is to inform interest 
groups when new subjects or events enter into the political debate; the second role is 
to inform political actors with the aim of influencing political outcomes and action; 
and third, to interface between political elites and their constituencies (2013, p. 314). 
In the first normative role, the political satirist finds a challenge. It is implied that the 
political satirist must select which issues should be part of the agenda and issues that 
should not, and this threatens his position as an impartial observer who is committed 
to exposing political folly wherever it may lie. In the second normative role, political 
satire encounters another challenge. As Holbert points out, there is no call to action 
in political satire, and that, when the political satirist steps into the field of political 
advocacy, he relinquishes his role as a satirist (2013, p. 315). Once again, citing the 
example of Jon Stewart who has done advocacy work like his Rally for Sanity. The 
third normative role, within a pluralistic democracy, is that of informing political elites 
on the needs of their constituents. Here, Holbert’s appreciation of the political satirist 
as a vector of communication between these two social segments is less positive. For 
him, the political satirist’s normative value is significantly reduced, as he argues that 
elites do not rely on political entertainment to access the needs of their constituents, 
often depending on their own organizations (Bennett & Manheim in Holbert 2013), 
traditional news outlets and other resources like surveys and polling.  
Finally, Holbert looks at the role of political satire as a tool for political 
communication within the frame of elitist democracy, which according to the author 
produces the most interesting results. Holbert claims that in an elitist democracy, the 
requirements for political communication are to expose corruption and incompetence 
at the higher spheres of leadership, since in elitism it is inferred that power is in the 
hands a small clique of experts. As Holbert has argued before, the power of the 
political satire lies in its ability to expose human folly, therefore being a useful tool in 
the exposition of corruption and incompetence of those in power (Holbert 2013, p. 
316).  
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In summary, political satire can be a normative good in different democratic 
contexts and in different ways, but its greatest normative power across all types 
democracy is its ability to expose those in power, thus humanizing them. 
  
2.2.1. Fictional Political Dramas 
The ninth in the typology is fictional political dramas. This is also the most 
relevant of Holbert’s category for this dissertation’s research aims. This type of 
content is characterized by dramas set against a political background, such as The 
West Wing with its dramatization of the American presidency or the North American 
version of House of Cards, which chronicles the ascent of Democratic congressman 
Frank Underwood and what goes on in the background of party politics in the 
American Congress.  Regarding The West Wing, Holbert argues that “many episodes 
of this program provide either the fictional President Bartlet, one of his staff 
members, or other elected officials the opportunity to clearly articulate explicit 
positions on a given policy issue” (p. 446). This facet of the fictional political drama 
differentiates the socio-political messages provided by this type of content from the 
ones provided by the other categories in his typology, according to Holbert. 
Van Zoonen and Wring (2012), in their historical analysis of politically themed 
television series in the United Kingdom, argue that dramas are often set around the 
inner workings of the political machinery and the interrelationships between 
politicians focusing on the social and psychological aspects giving it a “soapish 
flavor” (Van Zoonen & Wring 2012, p. 10). The recurring themes identified by the 
authors are “the tensions that everyday political, party and media pressures create, 
especially for left-wing activists and idealism” (Van Zoonen & Wring 2012, p. 10). 
Themes of compromise between one’s idealism and the pragmatic nature of the 
political machine such as television series like Bill Brand, Love and Reason and Our 
Friends in the North. 
Within the boundaries of fictional political dramas, we can include political 
thrillers, which often feature shared themes. For Van Zoonen and Wring (2012), 
political thrillers are framed as narratives where the characters are faced “with 
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identifiable collective actors undermining government and/or the democratic process 
for political or financial gain” (Van Zoonen & Wring 2012, p. 8). The authors identify 
as sources of conspiracy, insidious foreign influences such as multinational 
corporations ranging from the food industry in Natural Lies, the oil industry in State 
of Play and financial markets in The State Within. An exception identified by Van 
Zoonen and Wring is the original version of House of Cards which first aired in 1990 
and was distributed by the BBC, where a ruthless politician and his ascent to power 
replace insidious outside influence. The realistic frame is also evident in the thriller. 
According to Van Zoonen and Wring, references to state surveillance and real world 
conflict are common, and “many were framed as implicitly referring to the situation 
in Northern Ireland” (2012, p. 9). The presence of real world political figures in the 
production of this content lends credibility to the realist frame. As Van Zoonen and 
Wring point out the television series, House of Cards was based on a novel written by 
Conservative politician Michael Dobbs and A Very British Coup is based on a novel by 
Labour MP Chris Mullin. 
Another dimension when dealing with how the political is represented in fiction is 
the differences present in the framing of the political in the United Kingdom and the 
United States (Van Zoonen & Wring 2012; Van Zoonen 2007 Fielding 2014; Bailey 
2011). Referencing Robert Putnam, Fielding points out that the decline in trust of the 
average citizen with its elected representatives is linked with the decline in social 
capital, 
that is the extent to which citizens connected with their family, friends, neighbors and 
co-workers. He argued that as social capital diminished so did those norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness, which had once underpinned popular participation in 
– and regard for – representative politics.  
Fielding 2014, p. 327 
But Fielding also argues that political scientists undervalue the extent that fiction 
played a role. For Fielding, the decline of trust in politicians in the UK is also the result 
“of important changes in the nature of television, which meant dramatists were 
increasingly encouraged to reinforce the belief that politicians of all parties were 
uniquely corrupt” (Fielding 2014, p. 327). These changes in television were brought 
about by the decline in television dramas and a greater demand for “soap operas, 
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costume dramas and crime serials” (Fielding 2014, p. 336). This also coincided with 
an increase in the level of competition in television ratings:  
Greater competitive pressures meant those commissioning dramas narrowed and 
became more formulaic. In the chase for audiences now scattered amongst many 
more channels than ever before, those responsible for commissioning terrestrial 
television dramas became concerned as never before to give audiences what they 
presumed they wanted.  
Fielding (2014, p. 336) 
In the case of the UK, audiences wanted what Fielding classifies as sleaze, which 
framed politics and politicians around themes of financial corruption, abuse of 
power, sexual impropriety and spinning. In Fielding’s (2014) quantitative analysis of 
24 television programs including comedies, dramas and documentaries with 
dramatizations, the theme of spinning was present 18 times, abuse of power 6 times, 
sexual impropriety 6 times and corruption 3 times. Meanwhile, in the United States, 
television programs like The West Wing which Bailey describes as “functioning as a 
sort of televised civics class” (Bailey 2011, p. 284) were being broadcast. Van Zoonen 
finds that, in this program, the United States presidency is framed as being 
inspirational, and that the West Wing provides an “especially fertile for people 
reflecting on the moral and political dilemmas that they consider part and parcel of 
the political process” (2007, p. 545).  
 
2.3. Empirical research on effects of exposure to entertainment 
As we have pointed out, our study seeks to contribute to a growing body of 
research on the effects of exposure to entertainment media on political attitudes such 
as political efficacy, attitudes towards political parties and trust in political institutions, 
focusing on the exposure to fictional political dramas. As Holbert hints in his 
typology, there are plenty of empirical research on these effects. It is imperative to go 
through some of this research so has to see how our own study can contribute to the 
discussion. In an extensive study of the influence of pop culture on young adult 
political socialization and attitudes, Jackson (2009) – using data gathered from 
surveys on political socialization, attitudes and pop culture preferences - puts forward 
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interesting findings. For Jackson (2009), political socialization is defined as process 
whereby individuals obtain knowledge of political beliefs, values and norms. It is a 
process in the sense that it does not occur in a short period of time and it cannot be 
pinned down to a singular or specific event; in other words, it is a complex set of 
developments, which, in the earlier stages of development, involve the individual’s 
parental influence as the baseline. The individuals then acquire knowledge through 
schooling and other forms of social interaction like peer relationships and, as Jackson 
argues, from popular culture (pp. 3-6). 
The effects of entertainment culture in political socialization are so prevalent that 
in the United States, 33.9% American youths are more likely to identify themselves 
ideologically with Arnold Schwarzenegger than with their mother. Jim Carrey gets 
44.8% of young American identification, and 46.6% for Bruce Willis (p. 60). This is 
interesting considering it provided a link between exposure to celebrity culture and 
cultivation effects at the level of ideological identification.  
As Jackson also observes a link between music preferences and young adult’s 
political atitudes and argues that music is most likely to have the greatest degree of 
influence in the political attitudes of young citizens. The author defends this assertion 
by point out that it is with music that young people in the United States spend most 
of their time and money when it comes to entertainment habits. A tendency is also 
observed in Canadian, Irish and United Kingdom youths (Jackson 2009, p. 84). But 
what is the effect of this exposure to music on young people’s political attitudes?  
Music preferences also correlate to political preferences, according to Jackson. 
For example, in the United States, alternative rock fans tend to be more liberal than 
non-fans. While classic rock fans and country music fans tend to lean towards 
conservatism. However, country music fans were more likely to identify themselves as 
being moderate, while both alternative and classic rock fans tended towards political 
polarization (p. 96). Within the rap fan demographic, white rap fans identified 
themselves overwhelmingly as being liberal, a tendency observed in alternative rock 
fans as well. The author also observed a relationship between musical preference and 
partisan politics. Rap and country fans where far more likely to sympathize with the 
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Democratic Party than either classic and alternative rock fans (Jackson 2009 pp. 96-
97). By the author’s own admission, it is hard to offer a theory that explains this. 
Despite this, Jackson’s empirical findings are interesting because they correlate pop 
cultural preferences and consumption habits with political preferences and attitudes.  
Relative to Holbert’s second category mentioned above, Holbert, Shah & Kwak 
(2003) point out that female characters in situation comedy television often discuss 
openly issues such as sexuality and contraception as well as having to balance 
domestic and family life with their career. Through regression analysis, the authors 
were able to observe a relationship between watching situation comedies and 
support for women’s rights, especially when the data was set against those who 
watch more traditional television which places men in positions of greater narrative 
prominence such as leadership roles in their respective communities while women in 
these shows are relegated to more domestic and caregiving roles.  
Regarding soft news, the fifth category in Holbert’s typology, Baum (2002) 
points out that it provides news content for audiences who generally are not 
interested in political issues and consequently have lesser degrees of exposure to 
more traditional news formats. Through a series of statistical tests using data from 
the Pew Centre survey of media consumption habits, the author observed that 
greater exposure to soft news was associated with a greater familiarity with 
international affairs. 
In another study Baum (2004), looks into the implications of the differentiated 
way soft news outlets cover American foreign policy and military interventions. Baum 
points out that soft news usually frames the issue more dramatically and with a focus 
on human-interest themes. The researcher was able to establish a relationship 
between exposure to soft news and isolationist tendencies and skepticism towards 
American foreign interventionism among those least political attentive.  
Baum and Jamison (2006) were able to establish a relationship between soft 
news consumption and a greater degree of propensity to vote consistently among 
those least politically attentive, going so far as to conclude that their findings suggest 
that “less politically aware citizens can act reasonably effective in the voting booth 
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without much hard news, presumably because alternative sources (…) provide them 
with sufficient political cues to vote in their own interests” (Baum & Jamison 2006, p. 
958).  
Despite the evidence produce by Baum, Prior (2003) in exploring the relationship 
between exposure to soft news content and political knowledge came across 
interesting results, which contradict the research of some scholars who argued that 
soft news attracted audiences who otherwise would not be inclined to watch other, 
more traditional and less entertainment based news formats. Prior’s finding 
consistently pointed in the direction that those who prefer soft news display less 
political knowledge than those who prefer hard news formats.  
Complementary to soft news are the entertainment talk show interviews where a 
politician is invited for a casual and laidback interview in a television show like The 
Tonight Show with Jay Leno and Late Show with David Letterman. These interviews 
are often comedic in nature and have more of a focus on life experience issues rather 
than political information. Nonetheless, in a study conducted by Baum (2005) on why 
North American presidential candidates began to appear on entertainment talk 
shows, like The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and Late Show with David Letterman in 
the 2000 presidential election, he argued that it was mainly due to the candidate’s 
willingness to reach a wider audience of citizens not predisposed to being exposed to 
political information, although he argues that people who received political 
information via entertainment talk shows “received substantially different 
information than their counterparts who tuned in to more traditional sources of 
election news.” (p. 230). These differences had an effect on voter attitudes, 
according to the author: less politically aware citizens who were exposed to 
candidates’ talk show appearances were more likely to consider the opposition more 
favorably. These effects tended to diminish with increased political awareness.  
In the field of empirical research on the effects of exposure to reality-based 
content, Escholz et al (2002) in a study aimed at assessing the effects of reality 
television centered around the police (shows like COPS or America’s Most Wanted), 
found that people who consume this type of television content were more likely to 
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believe that crime rates had risen in their county. Another interesting finding was that 
the consumption of police-themed reality television was associated with an increased 
trust in the police among the white population while in African-American viewers, 
increased viewing did not have a relationship with increased trust in the police. The 
researchers interpret the date as a result of the disproportional portrayal of African-
Americans as criminals versus the disproportional portrayal of the police as white 
males in these shows. 
In another study probing the relationship between crime-related television 
viewing (which in the study includes television news, reality television programs and 
crime-drama) and endorsements for capital punishment and gun ownership, Holbert 
et al (2004) found that police reality and crime themed reality television viewing is 
associated with support for police authority but the same does not apply to crime-
drama viewing and even less so with television news viewing. When it came to fear 
of crime, the researchers found out that both television news and police reality 
television viewing were related with greater fear of crime, while crime-drama viewing 
decreased fear of crime. The viewing of police reality shows and crime-drama had a 
relationship with endorsement of capital punishment, and in addition, police reality 
show viewing is also associated with support for gun ownership. It is important to 
review these studies because they demonstrate a positive relationship between 
television consumption habits and attitudes that have political implications such as 
endorsement of capital punishment, compliance with police authority and gun 
ownership.  
In a related study, on the relationship between television viewing and viewer’s 
perceptions of crime, Nabi and Sullivan (2001) found that time spent watching 
television was associated with an increased perception of widespread crime and 
violence in society, increased willingness to take protective measures and an 
increased belief that the world is a mean place. 
One of the genres of entertainment most explored by political scientists is 
traditional satire. Through a two-tiered research design wherein 212 undergraduate 
students’ reactions to politically themed comedic monologues delivered by comedian 
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Bill Maher were tested, Nabi et al (2007) found a positive relationship between how 
funny a message is with how the source is perceived as credible. Also, the funnier the 
message was perceived as, the less counterargument there was, that is, the ability to 
argue against the message that the participant is exposed to. From their first research 
design, the researchers were able to show three things; (I) that humor does not have 
a distracting effect on the ability of participants to process the message, and in fact, 
it might have an enhancing quality. (II) That humor is associated with less degree of 
counterarguing, and (III), that, despite this, humor is associated with message 
discounting (2007, p. 40). 
In the second research design, Nabi et al (2007), which largely replicates their 
first, the researchers found a sleeper effect, that is, one week after participants were 
exposed to Chris Rock’s funny social commentary messages, the researchers observed 
that those exposed to them manifested a persuasion effect that increased with time, 
which translated into attitude change. Nabi et al suggest that this might be explained 
due to the memorable nature of the message which prompted participants to think 
about the comedic messages they were exposed to (Nabi et al 2007, p. 50). 
These seemingly contradictory findings on the persuasive effects of political 
humor are echoed by Young (2008), who points out humor’s  
positive effect on attention, modest effects on comprehension, and no demonstrable 
effects on persuasion. (…) Meanwhile, research in psychology suggests that humor 
not only fails to reduce cognitive elaboration – but actually requires it – resulting in 
increased message recall.  
Young (2008 p. 120).  
Young’s research into the impact that humor has on the cognitive process of 
political messages used an experimental research design. In it, 263 participants were 
randomly assigned into 3 groups: (I) the humorous group, where participants read 10 
politically themed jokes before answering a survey. (II) The non-humorous group, 
where participants had to read 10 not-funny equivalents to the jokes of the 
humorous group, before answering survey questions, and (III), a control group, which 
skipped right to the survey questions.  
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Young’s findings are consistent with Nabi et al’s and show that being exposed to 
humorous messages resulted “in more thoughts aimed at humor comprehension and 
appreciation than the non-humorous stimuli”, also that “humor resulted in fewer 
total message-relevant thoughts. (…) In addition, humorous stimuli resulted in a 
smaller proportion of negative cognitive responses than did the non-humorous 
stimuli” (Young 2008, pp. 133-134). Young suggests that messages delivered in 
humorous ways are met by the recipients with less scrutiny, a tendency observed also 
by Nabi et al. Also consistent with Nabi et al was the finding that humor does not 
seem to have a short-term effect on persuasion and attitude change, but Young 
advances the hypothesis that this effect might be observable when prolonged 
exposure to humorous messages, such as the people who are frequent watchers of 
late-night comedy talk shows like David Letterman’s Late Show or Bill Maher’s 
Politically Incorrect.  
In a study conducted by Landreville et al (2010), on the relationship between the 
effects of viewing late-night comedy, which Holbert’s typology includes in the 
category of traditional satire, and talking about politics produced interesting results. 
Through regression analysis that late-night comedy viewing is a predictor of political 
debate viewing which in turn is a predictor of talking about politics. Using a statistical 
analysis of data from a sizable subsample of 796 respondents from the 2004’s 
National Annenberg Election Survey debate panel, the researchers found that: first, it 
is statistically significant that engagement with all types of political communication 
before watching a political debate on television increased the possibility that the 
same people would transition into watching the televised political debate. Second, 
debate viewing is statistically significant as an indicator of people having political 
discussions in the post-debate period (Landreville et al 2010, pp. 490-91). Thus, the 
Landreville et al were able to confirm their initial theory:  
Late-night TV comedy exposure was found to be a statistically significant positive 
predictor of debate viewing, and debate viewing was a statistically significant positive 
predictor of postdebate political talk. 
Landreville et al (2010, p. 491) 
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Basically, Landreville et al were able to come to the conclusion that late-night 
comedy is able to exert an indirect effect on political talk, through the increased 
likeliness of promoting political debate viewing. Despite this, the authors concede 
that there was no direct relationship between the two, “no main effect was found 
for late-night entertainment TV viewing on subsequent political talk” (Landreville et al 
2010, p. 491). 
In a similar study, Feldman and Young (2008) investigated the potential of late-
night comedy as a gateway to traditional news sources. The gateway hypothesis can 
be described thusly: viewers exposed to late-night jokes about political stories will be 
more inclined to then seek out more traditional news sources on politics in order to 
deepen their knowledge on the subject. Using data from the 2004’s NAES, gathered 
by the Annenberg Public Policy Centre, Feldman and Young looked into differences 
in news attention levels over the course of the 2004 presidential campaign between 
viewers of The Daily Show and viewers of The Tonight Show with Jay Leno or The 
Late Show with David Letterman. Through a cross-sectional study of the available 
data, the researchers found out a relationship between people who watch television 
news and greater attention levels to political campaign news and government and 
public affairs, which as Feldman & Young concede, is unsurprising. However, they 
discovered that attention levels in the aforementioned issues is even stronger for 
people who follow television shows like The Daily Show, The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno and The Late Show with David Letterman (Feldman & Young 2008, p. 409).   
The researchers moved on to perform a time series analysis of the 2004’s NAES 
dataset, wherein they found out that viewers of the previously mentioned television 
programs “are more inclined than non-late-night viewers to pay attention to 
traditional news at the outset of the primary campaign; most importantly, however, 
the attention of the Leno/Letterman dominant group also increases at a faster rate 
than does the non-late-night group” (Feldman & Young 2008, p. 416).   
Moy et al (2005) investigate the priming effects of late-night comedy on 
presidential candidates’ evaluation for the 2000 United States presidential elections 
and come across interesting results. With recourse to the NAES 2000 dataset, Moy et 
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al looked at evaluations of both George W. Bush and Al Gore in the period preceding 
and proceeding their respective appearances on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and 
The Late Show with David Letterman, using a variety of variables such as candidate 
evaluation and candidate’s character traits. They observed that in regard to character 
traits, respondents show significant changes with regards to pre and post late-night 
comedy show candidate appearance:  
statistically significant differences in respondent assessments emerged. In particular, 
respondents perceived Bush to be more honest, inspiring, and a leader, and rated him 
slightly warmer on the thermometer scale. Gore, on the other hand, was perceived to 
be more knowledgeable and caring. 
Moy et al (2005, p. 202)  
In a similar study, Baumgartner et al (2012) looked into the priming effects of the 
satirical impersonation of Sarah Palin, the running mate of John McCain in the 2008’s 
United States presidential elections, by comedic actress Tina Fey in multiple Saturday 
Night Live sketches. Using a dataset of 1755 young adult respondents enrolled in 10 
different universities across the United States, they observed that the average 
approval rating of Sarah Palin for respondents who saw the Saturday Night Live 
sketches was 8.5%, and the average disapproval rating was 75.7% versus the 
respondents who did not see the sketches whose average approval rating was of 
16.1%, and disapproval rating of 60.1% (Baumgartner et al 2012, pp. 98-99).  
When Baumgartner et al extended the analysis to the 2008’s Republican ticket as 
a whole, they observed that respondents exposed to the sketch were less likely to 
vote for McCain, 45.4% versus the 34% of people who were not exposed (pp. 100-
101). Finally, the researchers approached the dataset from an another angle, 
controlling for partisanship. They observed a significant negative effect of watching 
the sketches on self-identified Republicans and Independents (p. 101).  
One specific television program that falls under the traditional satire category 
that is continuously referenced in the literature and has been the focus of many 
scholarly articles is The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, which the subsequent 
paragraphs will be dedicated to.  
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Relative to The Daily Show with Jon Stewart we can find a number of relevant 
studies done which are worth reviewing for the sake of the present study. The first of 
these is Baumgartner and Morris’s (2006) research into the effects that viewing this 
entertainment television program has on political attitudes such as candidate 
evaluation and political efficacy. Using experimental methodology, the researchers 
conceived an experimental design in which participants were divided into three 
groups; one who was exposed to coverage of the 2004 presidential election’s clips 
from the The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, another who was exposed to news 
coverage of the same election from CBS Evening News, and a third control group 
who did not watch any television content whatsoever. After viewing the clips, all 
groups were instructed to answer a posttest survey, including the control group.  
Baumgartner and Morris’s come across interesting findings. They found that 
evaluations of both incumbent President George W. Bush and presidential candidate 
John Kerry were negatively affected by the exposure to the Daily Show clips, the 
association being statistically significant for John Kerry but not for George W. Bush. 
On the other hand, the exposure to conventional news clips from CBS Evening News 
did not influence the evaluation of either candidate in a significant way (Baumgartner 
and Morris 2006, p. 349). This finding had been hypothesized by the researchers 
beforehand, pointing out that media effects tend to impact the evaluations of less 
known candidates disproportionately when compared to more recognized ones 
(Baumgartner and Morris 2006, p. 345).  
In the same study, Baumgartner and Morris (2006) observed that being exposed 
to the Daily Show had negative effects on participants’ faith in the electoral system, 
one of the foundational pillars of contemporary representative democracy. This 
negative effect in the trust participants have in the electoral system was not 
observable in those exposed to the CBS Evening News clips. The effect of increased 
levels of cynicism is also extended to the perceptions of the news media themselves. 
Exposure to The Daily Show was related with decreased levels of trust in the news 
media, a relationship that was not observed in those participants who were exposed 
to the CBS Evening News clips (Baumgartner and Morris 2006, p. 352). 
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Relative to exposure to crime-drama television, a relevant piece of empirical 
research of attitude change is the experiment conducted Mutz and Nir (2010) to find 
out whether “narratives suggesting a favorable depiction of some target will 
influence political attitudes in a positive direction relative to unfavorable depictions of 
the same target” (Mutz & Nir 2010 p. 202). In the case of their study the target 
under review was the criminal justice system in the United States. Through their 
experiment, Mutz and Nir were able to conclude that fictional content – namely, 
from the TV show Law & Order – had an effect on viewers’ political attitudes. The 
researchers were even surprised to observe that the experiment had an effect on the 
viewers’ attitudes towards “deep-seated and immutable” attitudes such as the death 
penalty (pp. 210-11). Another important finding made by the researchers was the 
necessity of empathy as a condition for being influenced, which, as the researchers 
argue, makes it so that “television fiction may have a unique advantage over news in 
persuasive influence of this kind” (Mutz & Nir 2010, p. 212). Going so far as to quote 
studies that demonstrate that news stories do not succeed in influencing political 
attitudes in the viewer. For the authors it is the appearance of realism that lends a 
“distinct advantage in creating the kind of emotional involvement that facilitates 
persuasive effects on political attitudes” (Mutz & Nir 2010, p. 212). Going so far as to 
quote studies that demonstrate that news stories do not succeed in influencing 
political attitudes in the viewer.  
As we have surveyed, there is evidence of a relationship between exposure to 
entertainment content and changes in political attitudes. These attitudes are multiple 
in nature, from attitudes towards politicians like candidate evaluation, attitudes 
towards the criminal justice system to support for women’s struggle. Our research 
hopes, through the use of experimental methodology, laid out below, to contribute 






3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The aim of this chapter is to lay out the experimental research design employed 
in this study to analyze the effects of exposure to fictional political dramas on the 
audience’s political attitudes such as political efficacy, attitudes towards political 
parties and trust in political institutions. We will go through all its aspects in a 
thorough fashion: the research question and hypotheses which will be tested, the 
methodology employed to test them, the experimental design itself, a content 
analysis of the treatment and a description of the questionnaire used to measure the 
participant’s social-demographic data and political attitudes.  
 
3.1. Research question and hypotheses 
In this thesis, taking into consideration how politics and politicians are framed 
and represented in popular culture, as the literature has demonstrated, and focusing 
on the entertainment content produced for television and cinema, we propose to 
answer the following research question: What are the effects of exposure of fictional 
political dramas on an audience’s political attitudes? The dependent variables are the 
audiences’ political efficacy, attitudes towards political parties and trust in political 
institutions, while the independent variable is going to be the way politicians are 
represented in popular culture, specifically in political fictional dramas (positively vs. 
negatively).  
Positive representation of politicians is to be understood in this thesis as a 
representation that portrays politicians as responsible, idealistic and incorruptible. An 
example of a positive representation of a politician would be the cast of characters 
from the television series The West Wing, among them the President of the United 
States himself and his presidential staff. While a negative representation of politicians 
is to be understood as a representation that portrays politicians as opportunists, 
corrupt and scheming. An example of a negative representation of a politician would 
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most of the characters in House of Cards with Francis Urquhart being the greatest 
example. 
 Positive and negative effects are defined here as either an increase or decrease 
in participants’ political efficacy, in their favorable or unfavorable attitudes towards 
political parties, and finally in terms of an increase or decrease in their trust in political 
institutions. 
Political efficacy can be defined as the trust citizens have in the overall political 
process and how influential they perceive themselves to be to it (Niemi et al 1991; 
Pinkleton et al 1998; Aarts & Semetko 2003). Political efficacy can be divided into 
external and internal political efficacy. Broadly speaking, external political efficacy 
concerns the perception that the political process and institutions will respond to the 
demands of the citizenry, while internal political efficacy concerns the individual’s 
perceptions and faith that he can understand the political process with some degree 
of confidence therefore granting him the tools to effectively participate in it. The 
present research’s aims are concerned with the effects of exposure to political 
fictional dramas in the latter rather than the former. We chose to focus our analysis 
on external over internal political efficacy due to its relationship with the rest of the 
dependent variables in our study  
Relative to attitudes towards political parties, Fielding (2014) argues that 
television’s framing of politics, specially party politics in the age of New Labour has 
led to a considerable decline in positive attitudes towards political parties in the 
United Kingdom, through television series like The Thick of It and State of Play. This is 
due to changes in the nature of television which has been promoted by an increase in 
audience’s demand for entertainment content that frames politics in terms of 
corruption, sexual promiscuity, spin doctoring and so forth. These changes also 
coincided with an increase level of completion between television companies which 
have exacerbated the issue. Thus, for Fielding there is a clear link between the way 
party politics are framed in television and the audience’s attitudes towards the 
phenomenon.  
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Trust in political institutions is associated with one’s perceptions of risk. It 
pertains to situations where one does not have full information about the functioning 
of a particular political institution, its intentions and outcomes, but nonetheless one is 
still confident that these institutions will not abuse or otherwise misuse their power 
(Luhiste 2006). In the instance of this study, we will consider trust in political parties, 
Members of Parliament (MPs), the President of the Republic and the Portuguese 
Government). These particular institutions were selected given their importance in the 
Portuguese political system.  
The hypotheses to be laid out below are inspired by the research developed by 
Mutz and Nir (2010), which concludes that, “fictional content can affect 
respondents’ political attitudes and policy positions” (Mutz & Nir 2010, p. 210). 
These authors sought to test the effects of exposure to the crime drama Law & Order 
on participants’ attitudes towards the criminal justice system in the United States. 
Their experiment followed a two-group design wherein one group was exposed to an 
episode of the series depicted the criminal justice system in a favorable light, while 
the other group was exposed to was exposed to an unfavorable representation of 
that system from the same television series.  
Baumgartner and Morris (2006) also lay the ground work which supports the 
hypotheses in the study, despite not treating fictional political dramas. The 
researchers were able to discover, by employing experimental methodology, a 
relationship between exposure to politically charged entertainment television 
programing, more specifically The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, and political efficacy 
such as decreased levels of trust in the American electoral system, to lower candidate 
evaluations and to increase cynicism towards the news media themselves 
As Pinkleton et al’s (1998) research demonstrates, there is a positive relationship 
between mass media (which did not include fictional political dramas) use and 
political efficacy and voting behavior (p. 42). Aarts and Semetko arrived at similar 
conclusions when studying the Dutch case, by showing that people who watch public 
television news are more knowledgeable about politics, thus internal political efficacy, 
but this effect also extends to external political efficacy (p. 776). Although their 
 44 
findings indicate that those who watch commercial television, in detriment to public 
television news, are negatively on political knowledge, internal efficacy and voting 
behavior.  
Reinforcement for the hypotheses below is also supported by Moy et al (2005) 
and Baumgartner et al (2012). Through statistical analysis Moy et al (2005) discovered 
that, regarding the evaluation of character traits of both George W. Bush and Al 
Gore, showed significant changes in the assessments measured pre and post late-
night comedy show candidate appearances. Baumgartner et al (2012), through 
experimental methodology, found that exposure to the satirical impersonation of 
Sarah Palin by comedy actress Tina Fey in multiple Saturday Night Live sketches, 
primed young adult respondents enrolled in 10 different universities across the 
United States to rate Sarah Palin lower than those who had not been exposed. 
Thus, the hypotheses below can be postulated:  
• H1 - Being exposed to the West Wing has a positive effect on political 
efficacy. 
• H2 - Being exposed to House of Cards has a negative effect on political 
efficacy. 
• H3 - Being exposed to the West Wing has a positive effect on attitudes 
towards political parties. 
• H4 - Being exposed to House of Cards has a negative effect on attitudes 
towards political parties. 
• H5 - Being exposed to the West Wing has a positive effect on trust in 
political institutions. 
• H6 - Being exposed to House of Cards has a negative effect on trust in 
political institutions. 
 
3.2. Experimental methodology 
As McDermott points out, “the methodology of experimentation has been slow 
to garner a following in political science” (2002, p. 31), since there is a preference for 
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other methodologies such as case studies, comparative studies and quantitative 
analysis of statistical data. But as the author argues, it is the bringing together of 
more established methodologies with the emergent experimental methodology 
which offers “the most exciting opportunity for methodological advancement” since 
“formal models present hypotheses that are tested, refined, and explored through 
experimentation in a reciprocal manner” (2002, p. 31). This is precisely the intention 
of this thesis’; to test the hypotheses laid out by the literature utilizing experimental 
methodology.  
McDermott thusly defines the experimental method:  
I take the term to refer primarily to laboratory studies in which investigators retain 
control over the recruitment, assignment to random conditions, treatment, and 
measurement of subjects. This definition assumes that experimenters take pains to 
assure that the experimental situation does not vary in any way other than the 
intended independent variables in order to assure the internal validity that allows 
causal claims 
McDermott (2002, p. 32). 
Experiments are useful because through them researchers can mitigate biases 
“that can exist in less rigorous forms of observation” (McDermott, 2002, p. 33). Of 
the aspects enumerated by McDermott, standardization and randomization are very 
important. Standardization is important to experimental methodology since it makes 
it so that the same stimulus and procedure is analyzed and that the same variables 
are under scrutiny. “Standardization requires that the same set of experimental 
procedures, or experimental protocol, is administered in the same way to subjects 
across conditions” (McDermott 2002, p. 33). This narrows the chances of the 
experiment being corrupted by environmental conditions. Randomization makes sure 
that, by assigning subjects randomly, the experiment will not have biased results due 
to differences between groups.  
McDermott warns us against experimental bias, that is, by attempting to 
“maximize experimenter control over the independent variables in a study, the 
experimental process itself can introduce potential sources of bias” (McDermott 
2002, p. 34). These potential sources of bias can come in the form of expectancy 
effects, which occur when the researcher indirectly and unconsciously hints at the 
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purpose of the experiment to the subjects, which subsequently condition the 
subjects’ behavior. Reducing the involvement of the researcher with the subjects 
during the experiment can minimize this - and this is what has been done in the 
experiment reported here.  
 The most substantial concern regarding experimental methodology, especially 
to political scientists, is the tension between internal and external validity. Internal 
validity is understood to be the extent that causal relationships can be established 
within the experiment itself while external validity is understood to be the extent that 
the causal relationships established as a result of the experiment can be extrapolated 
to the general population. According to McDermott (2002), internal validity can be 
threatened by occurrences outside the control of the researcher, which can bias the 
results. Experiments that require more time between measurements are more 
vulnerable to this. But as McDermott points out, unexpected occurrences within the 
experiment itself can become sources of biases, such as “unknown preexisting 
relationships between some subjects might affect one session of an experiment but 
not another” (2002, p. 36). On the other hand, external validity can be threatened by 
unrepresentative subject samples, which can make it difficult to extrapolate the 
results of the experiment outside the sample of subjects. The Hawthorne effect also 
needs to be accounted for. As McDermott points out, the Hawthorne effect occurs 
when “people change their behavior merely because they are aware of being 
observed” (2002, p. 38).  
Despite these threats, there are advantages in using experimental methodology. 
As the author notes,  
no other methodology can offer the strong support for causal inferences that experiments allow 
(…). The ability to establish causal inferences; the ability to assert experimental control over most 
of the aspects of the experiment and the insurance that all the procedures are applied in a 
consistent and standardized manner; the ability to explore the details of the process where 
“complex relationships can be broken down and investigated in smaller units in order to see 
which part of the process results in the difference of interest  
McDermott (2002, pp. 38-39). 
  
Still, the question of external validity cannot be avoided. That said, given that 
most experiments are artificial constructs that cannot accurately recreate the totality 
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of social phenomenon of our everyday lives and since, as McDermott argues, there 
are ethical and financial constraints that condition the work of researchers who 
employ experimental methodology, this thesis is primarily interested in establishing 
valid causal relationships within the experiment itself. 
 
3.3. Experimental design 
The participants were recruited from the Department of Languages and Cultures 
and the Department of Social, Political and Territorial Sciences of the University of 
Aveiro. Potential participants were approached in class, and were told that they could 
volunteer for a study aimed at looking into the entertainment habits of the 
university’s students. This concealment of the real aims of the study was done 
intentionally to minimize bias in the participants’ responses.  
After the recruitment phase was over, participants were randomly assigned into 
two groups, each being exposed to different treatments. The structure of each 
treatment is identical: first, participants were asked to answer a pretest questionnaire. 
Following this, participants were asked to watch the first episode of The West Wing 
(“Pilot”) and of House of Cards (“Chapter 1”). We chose these television shows 
specifically for their valenced framing of the political process. In The West Wing, we 
witness a generally positive portrayal of politicians (Van Zoonen 2007; Bailey 2011), 
while in House of Cards we are exposed to a generally negative portrayal of 
politicians. A content analysis of each episode can be surveyed in Table 1 below. The 
treatments were administered to each group separately, with each participant having 
her own screen and set of headphones so as to avoid chatter between participants. 
These sections were conducted in computer laboratories of each of the departments 
mentioned above.  
And finally, after viewing the episode, participants were asked to answer a final 
posttest questionnaire in order to measure the impact of exposure to the treatment. 
Participants were not told in the initial briefing that they would be answering a 
posttest questionnaire after watching the episode. This was done to avoid the 
possibility that participants would remember their answers in the pretest 
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questionnaire, thus weakening the findings. The experimental design used in this 
study is an example of the pretest-posttest multiple experimental design laid out by 
Holbrook (2011). It is important to remember that the purpose of this research design 
is to test the effects of the valenced frames generated by the episodes. Given the 
time restraints inherent of this experimental design, it is impossible to test more 
general cultivation effects since that theory is grounded in long-term exposure to 
mass media stimulus.  
 
3.3.1. Episodes used in the treatment 
In order to justify the choice of each episode for the experimental treatment 
employed by this study, a plot synopsis of each of them will be presented as well as a 
brief content analysis of the episodes aimed at identifying the themes of each one 
(Table 1). These episodes are to be considered as the treatments in our study. 
 
3.3.2. The West Wing’s Pilot 
It has been mentioned before, participants assign to the positive framing of 
politics watched the first episode of the North American television series The West 
Wing. As Holbert et al’s point out in their research into the priming effects of 
watching the series (Holbert et al 2003), the West Wing’s fictionalized version of the 
American presidency was perceived more positively than both George W. Bush’s and 
Clinton’s presidencies.  
In The West Wing’s first episode, we are introduced to the cast of hard-working 
politicians which constitute the staffers for Josiah Bartlet’s presidential cabinet. The 
characters are introduced through multiple scenes as they are called into work, 
following news that the president fell in a bicycle crash. Tangential to this plot line, 
we have the character of the White House Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Lyman. Who in 
the day before in a televised debate with a Christian activist attacked the church’s tax 
exemption status, saying "Lady, the God you pray to is too busy being indicted for 
tax fraud" and is now faced with the possibility of losing his position in staff. In the 
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meantime, we see White House Deputy Communications Director, Sam Seaborn 
engage in sexual relations Laurie who, unbeknownst to him, is a call girl. The episode 
deals mainly with how these characters’ deal with these dramatic and moral 
dilemmas and how they interact with each other within the context of the White 
House. The general tone of the episode, establish through the series soundtrack and 
the relationship between the characters who are often busy solving the latest political 
crisis but nonetheless find time to spit witty remarks at each other, is one of 
earnestness and public service.  
As we have mentioned in the Chapter 2, priming relates to the importance 
certain topics are given in mass media and how these selected topics become the 
gauge with which they assess the performance of the government, in the instance of 
the West Wing’s pilot, the United States Presidency. As such, those who watch the 
episode can be primed into believing that in order to be a successful politician one 
must be talented, educated, honorable and conscientious like the characters on the 
show should be national decision makers. 
 
3.3.3. House of Cards - Chapter 1 
Participants assigned to watch the negative framing of politicians were given the 
first episode of the remake of House of Cards. Scholarly work on the United States’ 
remake of the original British television show is scarce. But due to its similarities in the 
way it frames politicians with its more recent version, it is relevant to survey the 
scholarly work done about the original television show. As Van Zoonen and Wring 
point out, this show:  
presents the story of cold- blooded and suave Tory Chief Whip Francis Urquhart on his 
Machiavellian route to the premiership. Three four-episode seasons (1990, 1993, 
1995) show Urquhart eliminating his opponents through blackmail, leaking 
compromising details to the press and literally killing the people in his way”  
Van Zoonen & Wring (2012, p. 9). 
In the 2013 American remake of the television show, we follow Francis 
Underwood, the Democratic Party’s Majority Whip in the Unites States Congress, 
who in the beginning of the show’s plot line is snubbed by the newly elected United 
 50 
States President Garret Walker, who promised Underwood the position of Secretary 
of State in the new presidential cabinet. This sets off a chain of events where 
Underwood will use all his charm and cunning to destroy Walker’s presidency and 
rise to power through coercing lower level congressmen such as the alcoholic and 
promiscuous Representative Peter Russo, who after being caught driving drunk with a 
prostitute is forced to swear loyalty to Underwood in exchange for being saved from 
scandal and imprisonment through bribery. Another plotline in the episode revolves 
around a young and ambitious political reporter for the Washington Herald, Zoe 
Barnes who Underwood encounters. Underwood and Barnes develop a mutually 
beneficial relationship where Underwood feeds her insider information into the inner 
working of congress in exchange for spin doctored news articles and profiles against 
Underwood’s political foes.  
If on one hand, the West Wing’s pilot was priming the audience into assessing 
one’s aptitude to be a politician by giving relevance to such attributes as honor, high 
education standards and ethical rectitude. House of Cards is priming people that in 
order to be a successful politician one must be ruthless with one’s rivals, compromise 
ethical values in the name of power accumulation and that this behavior produces 




Table 1) Content analysis of the episodes used in the treatment 
Behavior display on 
The West Wing’s Pilot House of Cards’ Chapter 1 
Hard working politicians Lewd behavior 
Politicians working for the good 
 of the population 
Politician fails to deliver 
 on his promises 
Backstage deals Backstage deals 
Lewd behavior Collusion with the press 
- 
Pragmatic ruthlessness  
over political ideals 
- Corruption 
- Spin doctoring 
 
3.3.4. Participants 
The data used in this experimental study was collected by the author between 
the 26th of May 2015 and the 28th of July 2015. The sample is composed of 52 
university students from the University of Aveiro, more specifically from the 
Department of Languages and Cultures and the Department of Social, Political and 
Territorial Sciences. As Holbrook (2010) argues, university students often bring with 
them problems for experimental research such as, homogeneity between subjects, 
and the higher degree of susceptibility to persuasion effects that this demographic 
experiences. This is echoed by McDermott citing Sears who point out, that university 
students often are “more self-absorbed; they have less crystallized attitudes, a less 
clear sense of self, higher rates of compliance, less stable peer relationships, and 
stronger cognitive skills” (McDermott 2002, p. 37). Despite this, McDermott counter 
argues that many experiments that used university students as participants in 
experimental designs have proved to be exceptionally reliable. Druckman and Kam 
(2010), also urge that political scientists who employ experimental methodology in 
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their research should not fear of relying upon students as their subjects for 
experimental designs. The original aim of the research design was to have a sample 
of sixty participants but due to time constraints, we fell slightly short of the original 
goal. 
In view that the participants in our research design are from Portugal, it is 
important to discuss young people’s political attitudes in Portugal. According to 
Magalhães and Moral (2008), young people in Portugal tend to be dissatisfied with 
politics, despite displaying a lesser degree of dissatisfaction with politics than older 
adults. In general, young people also tend to be less involved in politics, but they 
display slightly higher levels of external political efficacy when compared with older 
adults. Crucially, younger people tend to be less exposed to political information and 
subsequently are less knowledgeable about politics. When it comes to self-
identification in the left-right spectrum, young people in Portugal tend to identify 
themselves more in the right-wing side of the scale than older adults, but nonetheless 
place less confidence on such political identities.  
Lobo et al (2015) echo the findings mentioned above about young people and 
their relationship with politics. Young people in general display lower levels of party 
membership than the rest of the Portuguese population, but on the other hand, they 
are more likely to sign a petition, participate in boycotts, make politically motivated 
purchases, have more favorable attitudes towards the environment, and are more 
likely to participate in fund raising campaigns for political and social associations. 
These findings are in line with Jackson (2009), who points out that young people 
tend to think about politics in a different way than their adult counter-parts. Taking 
this in consideration, it is likely that young people in Portugal might be affected by 
non-traditional forms of political information such as political satire or fictional 
political dramas, when compared with the rest of the population. 
 
3.3.5. Questionnaire 
The pretest questionnaire was designed to take twenty minutes to complete. It 
contained twenty-seven questions in total, and the posttest questionnaire sixteen 
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questions. These included, first, socio-demographic questions such as age and gender 
of the participants.  Questions regarding the television-viewing habits of participants 
were also assessed, in terms of the average amount of hours spent per week 
watching television series, preferred genres, the average amount of time spent 
discussing television programs with friends, family, and co-workers, and preferred 
viewing routine. The questionnaire also measured political attitudes such as interest 
in political issues, where in the left-right scale did participants place themselves, 
frequency with which the volunteers in this study talk about politics to their friends, 
family and co-workers, satisfaction with democracy, as well as several items aimed at 
operationalizing our dependent variables: political efficacy (no influence in 
government, politicians do not care, particular interests have too much influence, and 
citizens have no opportunity), attitudes towards political parties (political parties are 
all the same, political parties are necessary in democracy, and political parties divide 
people) and levels of trust in specific political institutions (political parties, Members 
of Parliament (MPs), President of the Republic and Government of Portugal). The 
specific question wordings and scales used to measure the dependent variables are 
presented in Chapter 5, along with the description of the results. For the complete 
questionnaires used in this study, check the appendix section of this study. 
All questions designed to measure the political attitudes of the participants were 
taken from already used questionnaires employed in other studies, namely the 2012 
Mass Questionnaire Survey used in the CIES – ISCTE study entitled “The Portuguese 
Members of Parliament in Comparative Perspective: Elections, Leadership and Political 
Representation”, the 2005 electoral study on the presidential elections in Portugal for 
ICS - University of Lisbon and the Eurobarometer 70 survey conducted in Portugal. 
Both the pretest and the posttest questionnaire are identical relative to the questions 
designed to measure political attitudes.  
Many researchers studying the effects of media exposure on political attitudes 
and efficacy have identified potential variables that play into how and how much 
media exposure can be impactful. Below, we will be looking at intervening variables 
measured in this study, outlined in Table 2. These variables are used to test how 
 54 
similar the two experimental groups are, so that we can make sure that both groups 
are equally susceptible to this type of treatment. 
When researching the effect of viewing police based reality television on 
perception about crime and policing, Eschholz et al (2002) found that watching COPS 
impacted perceptions about crime significantly more in men than women, but the 
same was not true when after watching news coverage about crime, which affected 
women to a greater degree. Thus gender has to be accounted for in the present 
research.  
Also, Jackson (2009) argues that socialization among peers is one of the 
foundational building blocks when individuals construct their political identities and 
worldview, going so far as to show that many young citizens in the United States 
actually identify themselves more often with celebrities rather than their parents 
(Jackson 2009, pp. 58-60). Nonetheless, we cannot ignore the contribution that 
socialization among peers and significant others has on young people’s political 
attitudes, thus one of the variables that we must measure are frequency with which 
the participants talk with their family, friends and co-workers about both political 
issues and about the television series they watch. We can also add to this variable 
another one, measuring with whom the participants usually watch entertainment 
television. 
Once again, Jackson aids our research by pointing out that there is a statistically 
significant negative relationship between hours spent watching entertainment 
television and talking about political issues and topics with one’s family, friends and 
co-workers (Jackson 2009, p. 79). As the author mentioned earlier, talking about 
politics is one of the pillars for the construction of one’s political identity. Thus we 
can assume that the amount of time the participants spend watching their favorite 
television programs will have an effect on the impact of being exposed to the 
treatment. We can also assume that accompanying this variable there is another one 
which compels the participants to engage in the type of social interaction, which is 
their interest in politics, thus we must take this into account when approaching the 
sample. 
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Another dimension approached by Jackson (2009) was whether young people 
identified themselves as being more liberal or more conservative and how does this 
interacts with the way young people use their media consumption to create their 
political identities and attitudes. The author finds that American conservative youths 
were more likely to disagree with the socio-political messages from films than young 
people who identified themselves as being liberal (Jackson 2009, pp. 55-57 & 71-72), 
which may mean that they are perhaps more skeptical and less susceptible to effects. 
Thus, it is clear that the present research must take into consideration the political 
self-identification of the participants in the left-right spectrum.  
The impact of these variables is controlled via the within-subject approach of 
data analysis, that is, what we do is to compare pre and post-treatment attitudes 
within each group. But when it comes to drawing comparisons about what happens 
in the two different experimental groups, one should also assume that the groups are 
similar in terms of these features. The two groups are believed to be similar because 
there was a random assignment of participants in the two experimental conditions. 
Nevertheless, to check whether randomization worked, given the relatively low 
number of participants in this study, in the next chapter I will devote some time to 
assess whether there are substantial differences between the two groups. 
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Table 2) Variables 
Variables Measure Additional notes 
Sex Scale  - 
Hours spent watching television Ordinal  - 
Time spent talking about television Ordinal  - 
With whom do watch television Nominal  - 
Identification in the left-right scale Scale (0-10) Recoded into a nominal variable 
Frequency talk about politics Ordinal -  




4. ANALYSIS OF THE SAMPLE 
 
What follows is a detailed descriptive analysis of the sample of university 
students who participated in this study on a voluntary basis (see Chapter 3 for a 
detailed account) and to see the degree of homogeneity between the two 
experimental groups. Given that our sample was small, we opted to set our level of 
statistical significance at 10%. Of the total 52 university students who volunteered 
for this study, 38 are female and 14 are male. Both groups are absolutely identical in 
terms of their gender distribution. The university students were aged between 18 and 
28 years old, averaging 21.37 years old. In order to see if the West Wing and the 
House of Cards groups were distinct in the average range of ages of the participants, 
an Independent Samples T-Test was performed, with a result that is statistically 
significant (Table 3). The West Wing group is slightly younger than the House of 
Cards group.  
 
Table 3) Demographic data 
 
Full sample West Wing House of Cards T-Test results 
Average age 21.37 20.77 21.96 t(50)=-1192; 
p=.080 
Male 14 7 7  
Female 38 19 19  
 
As part of the survey, the television viewing habits of the participants were 
assessed, following dimensions such as the average amount of hours spent watching 
television series, preferred genres of television, frequency of time spent talking about 
television programs with friends and family. As we can see in Table 4, when it comes 
to average amount of hours spent watching television series, 65.4% answered that 
they spent on average 1 to 5 hours a week, while 34.6% answered that they spent 
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more than 5 hours a week watching television series. In order to assess the amount 
of variance between the two groups, a Pearson Chi-square test was employed. The 
results were not statistically significant, which means that, relative to average amount 
of hours spent watching television series, both groups are homogenous (c2=1629; 
p=.653).  
 
Table 4) Average amount of hours spent watching television series 
Hours Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
1 to 2 hours a week 26.9% 34.6% 19.2% 
2 to 5 hours a week 38.5% 34.6% 42.3% 
5 to 10 hours a week 26.9% 23.1% 30.8% 
More than 10 hours a week 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 
 
In respect to the distribution of television genres young people in this study enjoy 
watching, there is a predominance of entertainment television such as drama, 
comedy, science fiction and fantasy over more information based television genres 
like news and commentary programs which is to be expected. This tendency 
continues to be observable when we break the sample up between West Wing and 
House of Cards groups (Table 5). 
In order to see if both groups were homogenous in regard to the number of 
participants who watch drama, crime dramas and news programs, a Pearson Chi-
square test was employed but with no statistically significant results1.  
  
                                            
1 Results: Drama c2=0.780; p=.500, news programs c2=0.391, p=.378, and crime dramas c2=1.926, p=.133. 
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Table 5) Preferred genres of television - Multiple responses possible 
Genre of television Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
Comedy shows 76.9% 80.8% 73.1% 
Fantasy 59.6% 65.4% 53.8% 
Science Fiction 57.7% 57.7% 57.7% 
Drama 55.8% 53.8% 57.7% 
Crime dramas 48.1% 38.5% 57.7% 
Horror 30.8% 26.9% 34.6% 
News programs 26.9% 30.8% 23.1% 
Sports 21.2% 15.4% 26.9% 
Commentary programs 21.2% 26.9% 14.4% 
Talk shows 19.2% 15.4% 23.1% 
 
The next variable to be approached was the average amount of time spent 
talking about television programs with friends, family and co-workers. We can 
observe that the largest segment of the sample, 53.8%, says that they sometimes 
talk about the television programs they watch with their peers (Table 6). 
Relative to the average amount of time spent talking about television programs 
with friends, family and co-workers for both the West Wing and House of Cards 
groups, the distribution is identical (Table 6). On both groups we can observe that the 
largest segment of both groups is composed of people who say that they sometimes 
talk about television programs with friends, family and co-workers sometimes. 
A quick observation of Table 6, tells us that both the West Wing and House of 
Cards groups are identical when it comes to this variable, therefore making it 
unnecessary to employ a Pearson Chi-square test. 
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Table 6) Average amount of time spent talking about television programs with 
friends, family and co-workers 
Frequency Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
Never 7.7% 7.7% 7.7% 
Sometimes 53.8% 53.8% 53.8% 
Frequently 35.8% 35.8% 35.8% 
 
 Following the assertion made earlier in a previous chapter that socialization is 
important in the development of one’s political identity, we look at how the 
participants usually watch their preferred television series. As we can see in Table 7, 
most participants in the study say that they watch television series by themselves, 
86.5%. This is followed by the people who also watch their favorite television series 
with their boyfriend or girlfriend, 30.8% (multiple responses were possible in this 
variable). This is relevant because, in the experiment, most people watched the 
episode by themselves that seems to replicate the most usual way the participants 
watch television series. This should contribute to the external validity of the findings. 
Looking at the treatments separately we do not observe any significant 
difference between the two groups, as both display a predominance of people who 
watch their favorite television series by themselves (Table 7) A Pearson Chi-square 




Table 7) Generally, how do you watch your favorite television series - Multiple 
responses possible 
How Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
By myself 86.5% 92.3% 80.8% 
With my family 13.5% 15.4% 11.5% 
With my 
boyfriend/girlfriend 30.8% 26.9% 34.5% 
With friends 15.4% 15.4% 15.4% 
 
 As part of the pre-treatment survey, participants were also asked to answer 
questions designed to measure their political attitudes. Categories such as self-
identification in the left and right of the political spectrum, interest in politics, 
frequency with which the participants discussed politics with friends, family and co-
workers and satisfaction with democracy.  
 As we can observe in Table 8, most participants identify themselves as being in 
the center of the political spectrum, 50% of the total sample to be exact. The second 
largest group are the participants identifying themselves as being left-wing, 36.5% of 
the whole sample. Initially this variable was measured in a scale from 0-10, wherein 1 
was extreme left and 10 extreme right. We recoded it into a nominal variable in order 
to facilitate result analysis.2 
When we separate the full sample into the treatment groups, we notice a total 
absence of right-wing participants in the West Wing treatment as we can see in Table 
8. What we observe is an even distribution between self-identified left-wing and 
center participants, 46.2% and 53.8% respectively. When we compare these findings 
with the House of Cards sample, the situation changes in a significant way. As we 
can see in Table 8, there is an equal distribution between participants who identify 
                                            
2 Recoding parameters were: 0-3 = left-wing, 4-6 = centre, 7-10 = right-wing. 
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themselves as left-wing and right-wing, both being 26.9% of the sample. Therefore, 
there seems to be a visible difference in left-right self-identification between the West 
Wing and House of Cards sample, a Pearson Chi-square test was performed which 
produced statistically significant results (c2=8470; p=.014). 
 
Table 8) Self-identification in the left and right of the political spectrum 
Left-right Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
Left-wing 36.5% 46.2% 26.9% 
Centre 50% 53.8% 46.2% 
Right-wing 13.5% 0% 26.9% 
 
When we look at the frequency with which the volunteers in this study talk 
about politics to their friends, family and co-workers, we can observe that 73.1% 
participants in this study talk to their peers about political issues only sometimes 
(Table 9). 
We observe very modest differences between the two treatments, but they are 
not statistically significant (c2=3553; p=.169). The percentage of participants who say 
that they never talk about politics with their peers decreases from 30.8% in the 
House of Cards sample to 11.5% in the West Wing sample, while the percentage of 
participants who say that they sometimes talk about politics with their peers increases 
form 61.5% among the participants assigned to the House of Cards treatment in 
relation to the 84.6% of participants assigned to the West Wing treatment.  
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Table 9) Frequency with which you talk about politics to their friends, family 
and co-workers 
Frequency Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
Never 21.2% 11.5% 30.8% 
Sometimes 73.1% 84.6% 61.5% 
Frequently 5.8% 3.8% 7.7% 
 
Having measured how interested in politics the participants are, we can see an 
overwhelming lack of interest in political issues. The slice of participants who 
answered they are not interested is 53.8% while 26.9% of the participants said that 
they were mildly interested and 19.2% answered that they were interested, as we 
can see in Table 10. In both experimental groups most participants say that they are 
not interested in political issues; 61.5% of the West Wing group and 46.2% in the 
House of Cards group. By far the sharpest contrast between the two groups is 
observable in the percentage of people who said that they were interest in politics, 
with a sharp increase from 7.7% in the West Wing group to 30.8% in the House of 
Cards group (Table 10). In order to check the homogeneity relative to how interested 
participants are in political issues in both treatments, we employed a Pearson chi-




Table 10) Interest in political issues 
Interest in politics Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
Not interested 53.8% 61.5% 46.2% 
Mildly interested 26.9% 30.8% 23.1% 
Interested 19.2% 7.7% 30.8% 
 
When we look at how satisfied with democracy the university students in this 
study are, we observe that the majority of the participants are not really satisfied with 
democracy (53.8% of the total sample) (Table 11). 
 When we focus on each of the two experimental groups, we get no 
statistically significant differences in levels of satisfaction with democracy between 
the two experimental groups (c2=4949; p=.176). Participants who say that they are 
completely satisfied with democracy are negligible, only 3.8% in the West Wing 
sample and 0% in the House of Cards sample. Among the students assigned to the 
West Wing treatment, only 26.9% of them said that they were reasonably satisfied 
with democracy, while 53.8% of university students assigned to the House of Cards 
treatment responded that they were. In the West Wing group 57.7% responded that 
they were not really satisfied with democracy versus 42.3% in the House of Cards 
group. When we look at the participants who answered that they were not satisfied 




Table 11) Satisfaction with democracy 
Satisfaction with 
democracy 
Full sample - % West Wing - % House of Cards - % 
Satisfied 1.9% 3.8% 0% 
Reasonably satisfied 40.4% 26.9% 53.8% 
Not really satisfied 50% 57.7% 42.3% 
Not satisfied 7.7% 11.5% 3.8% 
 
The data analysis strategy employed in this study is within-subjects – that is, we 
are testing the effects of exposure to fictional political dramas within each group, 
before and after the treatment. Nonetheless, due to the existence of differences in 
the two groups, in terms of age and ideology, one should wonder if the two groups 
are, before the treatment, similar in terms of trust in political institutions, political 
efficacy and attitudes towards politicians, and if they are equally susceptible to this 
type of treatment. While the existence of differences would not impair the internal 
validity of the analysis on Chapter 5, the discussion of the results observed in both 
groups should acknowledge them.  
 We employed a test to look at the dependent variables in order to see if there 
were statistically significant differences between both groups in the pretest measures. 
This was done by performing Independent Samples T-tests on the mean values of all 
the dependent variables measured in the pretest. As we can see in Table 12, we do 
not get statistically significant results in the vast majority of our dependent variables, 
with the exception of the ones measuring levels of trust, specifically trust in political 
parties, the President of the Republic and the Portuguese Government. Moreover, 
these differences are of modest magnitude, usually 1 to 1.5 points in scales that 
range between 0 and 10.  
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WW mean HoC mean T-test results  
Political efficacy 
No influence in 
government 
4.10 4.46 3.73 t(50)=.897; p=.374 
Politicians do not care 6.12 6.46 5.77 t(50)=.897; p=.374 
Particular interests have 
too much influence 
7.37 7.23 7.50 t(50)=-.462; p=.646 
Citizens have no 
opportunity 
4.87 4.96 4.77 t(50)=-.282; p=.779 
Attitudes towards political parties 
Political parties are all 
the same 
6.54 6.23 6.85 t(50)=.341; p=.341 
Political parties are 
necessary in democracy 
7.12 6.92 7.31 t(50)=-.587; p=.560 
Political parties divide 
people 
3.75 3.50 4 t(50)=-.645; p=.522 
Trust in political institutions 
Trust in Political Parties 2.96 2.38 3.54 t(50)=-2067; p=.044 
Trust in MPs 2.40 2.12 2.69 t(50)=-1067; p=.291 
Trust in the President of 
the Republic 
2.56 2 3.12 t(50)=-1729; p=.090 
Trust in the Government 
of Portugal 2.81 2.12 3.50 t(50)=-2021; p=.049 
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It was also important to check if there were any major significant differences in 
how both groups were affected by the treatment they received. In order to do this, 
we measured the degree of variation between the dependent variables in the pretest 
and posttest and subsequently employed an Independent Samples T-test on the 
mean values. This produced no statistically significant results (t(50)=-773; p=.443), 
meaning that both experimental groups were evenly effected by the treatment. That 
is, on average, the magnitude of the effects is the same for both groups. Despite 
being slightly different in terms of age and ideology, as we saw above, both groups 
are equally susceptible to short-term shifts in their political attitudes after being 





5. TESTING THE HYPOTHESES  
In this following chapter we test the hypotheses laid out in a Chapter 3 in a 
series of paired samples T-tests that were employed in order to compare the pretest 
and posttest variables and measure the treatment effects. The nature of the data 
analysis strategy is within-subjects. In other words, we are testing the effects of 
exposure to fictional political dramas within each group, before and after the 
treatment. In view of this we will not only test for statistical significance between the 
pretest and posttest values, we will also be looking at the mean values themselves 
and the degree with which they are impacted by the treatment. It is important to 
note that we are not claiming that both instances are equally important, but 
nonetheless it is interesting to look at these changes in the mean values because they 
might suggest patterns that could prove useful in future research.  
 
5.1. Testing hypothesis 1 (Political Efficacy – The West Wing) 
In H1 we predict that exposure to the West Wing would result in an increase of 
the participants’ political efficacy. In order to do this, we conducted a series of 
paired-samples T-tests (all hypotheses were tested using this model). As we can see in 
Figure 1 and Table 13, the results tend to be mixed. 
When we measure the effects on the perceived levels of influence participants 
have on the government’s decisions3 and on the perception that individual interests 
have too much pull on the making of public policies4, we observe no statistically 
significant results5. In the first instance there is almost no difference whatsoever 
between the pretest and the posttest means, (4.26 and 4.27), while on the second 
instance we can only observe a very modest decrease towards the expected direction, 
from 7.23 in the pretest mean to 7.00 in the posttest mean (Figure 1, Table 13).  
                                            
3 Question: As pessoas como eu não têm nenhuma influência naquilo que o governo faz. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
4 Question: Interesses particulares te ̂m demasiado peso na feitura das leis. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
5 Inferential test results t(25)=0.467; p=.644 and t(25)=1.000; p=.327, respectively 
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On the other hand, when we test the effects of exposure to the West Wing on 
perceptions that the demands and opinions of regular citizens are not important to 
politicians6, we observe a decrease in the levels of agreement with this sentence, 
from 6.46 in the pretest mean to 5.35 in the posttest. This shift is statistically 
significant (t(25)=2568; p=.017), which is interesting and goes in the expected 
direction of exposure to a positive and idealistic representation of politicians such as 
the West Wing.  
This trend changes when we look at the effects of exposure to the West Wing 
on the perceived opportunities that ordinary citizens have to be a part of political 
decision 7 . We observe a statistically significant (t(25)=1786; p=.086) decrease in 
agreement with the idea that there are many such opportunities, which goes against 
the direction that was to be expected. A possible explanation for this unexpected 
result is that despite the overall positive framing of politics and politicians, which is 
the hallmark of the show, it nonetheless portrays White House staff and the President 
of the United States as extraordinary and gifted individuals. This could be sending the 
message to the audience that politics is something to be done by those individuals 
who are talented and extraordinary, and thus not something that the ordinary citizen 
is capable of doing. This is in line with potential priming effects in which participants 
may be primed into believing that only exceptional individuals such as the characters 
on the show are capable of being national decision-makers, and not ordinary people 
like them. As we saw in Chapter 2, priming relates to the importance certain topics 
are given in mass media and how these selected topics become the gauge with 
which they assess the performance of the government, in the instance of the West 
Wing, the United States Presidency. 
  
                                            
6 Question: Os políticos não se importam muito com aquilo que pensam pessoas como eu. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
7 Question: Os cidada ̃os te ̂m muitas oportunidades para participar nas deciso ̃es poli ́ticas. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
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 Figure 1) Effects on political Efficacy – The West Wing 
 
Notes: Statistically significant results boxed. 
 
Table 13) Effects on political Efficacy – The West Wing 
  Expected direction Sig 
People like me do not have any 
influence on what the government does No n.s 
Politicians do not care with that people 
like me think 
Yes p=.017 
Particular interest have too much pull 
on the making of public policy 
Yes n.s 
Citizens have many opportunities to 
participate in political decisions. 
No p=.086 
Notes:  paired-samples T test was used 









"Politicians	do	not	care	much	with	what	people	like	me	think" "Particular	interests	have	too	much	pull	on	the	making	of	public	polic" "Citizens	have	many	opportunities	to	participate	in	political	decisions"Pretest	mean Posttest	mean
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5.2. Testing hypothesis 2 (Political Efficacy – House of Cards) 
The second test to be conducted was on the House of Cards group. In H2 we 
predicted that exposure to a negative valenced frame of politics like House of Cards 
would produce a decrease in the participants’ political efficacy. As we can see in 
Figure 2 and Table 14, the results tend go towards the expected direction. But 
nonetheless we also observe one instance that seems to contradict the literature. 
Testing the effects of exposure to House of Cards on perceptions of how 
important the demands and opinions of participants are to politicians 8  and on 
perceived opportunities that ordinary citizens have to be a part of political decision9 
produced no statistically significant results10.  
Nonetheless, when testing the effects on the perceived levels of influence 
participants have on the government decisions11, we can see that exposure to House 
of Cards significantly increases agreement with the idea that normal people have no 
influence whatsoever (t(25)=-2952; p=0.007), with an increase from 3.73 in the 
pretest mean to 4.69 in the posttest mean. This is by far the best result our 
experiment produced, and clearly links exposure to a negative valenced framing of 
politics and a decrease in political efficacy. We also find statistically significant results 
when we test the effects of exposure to House of Cards on the perception that 
individual interests have too much pull on the making of public policy12 (t(25)=1742; 
p=.094). We observe a decrease from the pretest mean of 7.50 to 7.08 in the 
posttest mean. This contradicts our expectations, since the group agrees less with the 
statement after exposure to the episode.  
The first statistically significant result for H2, regarding the perceptions of one’s 
influence on government decisions, go in the expected direction, since the valenced 
                                            
8 Question: Os políticos não se importam muito com aquilo que pensam pessoas como eu. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
9 Question: Os cidada ̃os te ̂m muitas oportunidades para participar nas deciso ̃es poli ́ticas. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 
0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
10 Inferential test results t(25)=1286; p=.210 and on the second instance t(25)=.254; p=.802, respectively 
11 Question: As pessoas como eu não têm nenhuma influência naquilo que o governo faz. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
12 Question: Interesses particulares te ̂m demasiado peso na feitura das leis. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
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framing of politics that the television series provides is overwhelmingly negative. As 
we can see from the content analysis in Chapter 3, the show portrays the decision 
making process as a series of conspiracies and schemes set in the backrooms of the 
political process. According to the show, politics happens behind the curtains far 
away from the public and from public scrutiny. Not even the media can shed light on 
the process as it is often in collusion with it, condoning it in fact.  
The second statistically significant result for H2, which is also the weakest in the 
entire study, pertains to the impact on the perceptions that public policy is made in 
the name of individual interests, contradicts the predictions made in Chapter 3 since 
Exposure to House of Cards increases disagreement with the sentence. The 
explanation for this unpredicted result lies in the episode’s narrative itself. In the 
episode the main character struggles to push his self-interested agenda to bend the 
political system to his aims. Right in the first part of the episode, he losses the 
nomination to become Secretary of State and begins to set the scene for his rise to 
power. We never actually see Frank Underwood succeed in making public policy 
during the episode. 
 
Figure 2) Effects on Political Efficacy – House of Cards 
 
Notes: Statistically significant results boxed. 
3.73
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Table 14) Effects on Political Efficacy – House of Cards 
  Expected direction Sig. 
People like me do not have any influence on 
what the government does Yes p=.007 
Politicians do not care much with what people 
like me think 
Yes n.s. 
Particular interests have too much pull on the 
making of public policy 
No p=.094 
Citizens have many opportunities to 
participate in political decisions 
Yes NS 
 Notes:  paired-samples T test was used 
n.s: Not statistically significant 
 
5.3. Testing hypothesis 3 (Attitudes towards political parties – The West 
Wing) 
In Chapter 3 we predicted that exposure to a positive framing of politics in the 
West Wing would result in a better outlook on political parties from the participants. 
However, when testing this effect, no statistically significant results were produced 
(Figure 3; Table 15). 
Regarding the impact of exposure to The West Wing on the perception that 
political parties are all the same 13 , we observe no significant impact on this 
perception (t(25)=.529; p=.602), as the pretest mean of 6.23 only slightly drops to 
6.04 in the posttest, being these values virtually the same. Moving on to test the 
impact of exposure to on whether participants agree that political parties are 
necessary for democracy14, there is also no statistically significant increase or decrease 
in agreement with the aforementioned sentence (t(25)=.235; p=.816).This trend 
continues when we test for the impact of exposure to The West Wing on the 
                                            
13 Question: Os partidos criticam-se muito uns aos outros, mas na realidade sa ̃o todos iguais. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement 
14 Question: Os partidos políticos são necessários em qualquer democracia. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement 
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perception that political parties are responsible for dividing people15. Here we can 
also observe no changes in the levels of agreement with the sentence, which go from 
3.50 in the pretest mean to 3.62 in the posttest mean (t(25)=-.378; p=.709). 
Overall, exposure to the West Wing does not produce any significant impact on 
attitudes towards political parties. This could be explained by the fact that the plot of 
the episode used in the treatment features no narrative threads concerning 
themselves with party politics and therefore there is no opportunity for the show’s 
writers to frame the subject.  
 
Figure 3) Effects on attitudes towards political parties – The West Wing 
 
Notes: Statistically significant results boxed. 
  
                                            
15 Question: Os partidos políticos apenas servem para dividir as pessoas. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
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Table 15) Effects on attitudes towards political parties – The West Wing 
  Expected direction Sig. 
Political parties criticize each other all the 
time, but they are all the same 
Yes n.s. 
Political parties are necessary in any 
democracy No n.s. 
Political parties only serve to divide people Yes n.s. 
Notes:  paired-samples T test was used 
n.s: Not statistically significant 
 
5.4. Testing hypothesis 4 (Attitudes towards political parties – House of 
Cards) 
The fourth test to be conducted was aimed at measuring the effects of exposure 
to House of Cards on attitudes towards political parties as it was hypothesized in H4. 
Back in Chapter 3, we predicted that exposure to a negative framing of politics 
would result in a negative outlook towards political parties. There is only one instance 
in which this is so (Figure 4; Table 16). 
When analyzing the impact of exposure to House of Cards on the perception 
that political parties are all the same16 or that they are necessary for democracy17, we 
obtain no statistically significant results18 
However, we secured statistically significant results when we test for the impact 
of exposure to House of Cards on the perception that political parties are responsible 
for dividing people19. We see that the results move towards the expected direction, 
with an increase in the agreement for the aforementioned sentence, from 4.00 in the 
pretest mean to 4.62 in the posttest mean (t(25)=-2132; p=.043) Why is this so? If 
                                            
16 Question: Os partidos criticam-se muito uns aos outros, mas na realidade sa ̃o todos iguais. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, 
where 0 means complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
17 Question: Os partidos políticos são necessários em qualquer democracia. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement. 
18 Inferential test results t(25)=.398; p=.694 and t(25)=1443; p=.161, respectively 
19 Question: Os partidos políticos apenas servem para dividir as pessoas. Answer on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 
complete disagreement and 10 means total agreement 
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the West Wing treatment did not feature any framing of the party political game, 
House of Cards is rife with it. The show features heavily the backstage goings-on of 
congressional politics in the United States, thus offering plenty of opportunities for 
the show’s writers to frame the United States political process in Congress, which as 
we have seen in Chapter 3 is overwhelmingly negative. 
 
Figure 4) Attitudes towards political parties – House of Cards 
 
Notes: Statistically significant results boxed. 
 
Table 16) Attitudes towards political parties – House of Cards 
  Expected direction Sig. 
Political parties criticize each other all 
the time, but they are all the same 
Yes n.s. 
Political parties are necessary in any 
democracy 
Yes n.s. 
Political parties only serve to divide 
people 
Yes p=.043 
Notes:  paired-samples T test was used 
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5.5. Testing Hypothesis 5 (Trust in political institutions – The West Wing) 
Another dimension approached in the pretest and posttest questionnaires was to 
have the participants in the experiment rate, on a scale from 0 (no trust) to 10 
(complete trust), a variety of institutions which compose the political system in 
Portugal: political parties, the Members of Parliament (MPs), the President of the 
Republic and the Government of Portugal.  
As we initially predicted in Chapter 3, exposure to a positive framing of 
politicians should result in increased levels of trust in the political institutions 
mentioned above. As we can see in Figure 5 and Table 17, most of the participants 
rate these political institutions low in terms of trustworthiness.  
In terms of the effects of exposure to the West Wing, when it comes to trust in 
political parties, the average rating in the pretest (2.38) and posttest (2.42) do not 
display statistically significant differences (t(25)=-.372; p=.713). The second political 
institution to be tested for the effect of exposure to the treatment were MPs, and we 
see no change in the rating as the 2.12 pretest mean remains the same after the 
treatment. This could be explained by the fact that the episode of the West Wing 
used in the treatment features no character or plots that involve members of a 
legislature. The trend continues: when we measure the effects being exposed to the 
West Wing on trust in the government we can see no statistically significant impact 
from exposure (t(25)=.224; p=.603) (Figure 5). 
And finally, the institution that was effected the most by exposure to the West 
Wing was by far the President of the Republic. These results are statistically significant 
(t(25)=-1990; p=.058) When we test the effect, we see an increase in trust, from 
2.00 in the pretest mean to 2.31 in the posttest mean.  
These results can be explained by the interaction between an overwhelmingly 
positive framing of the President of the United States in the West Wing and the low 
levels of political sophistication that Portuguese young adults usually display, which 
are mistaking the two institution, despite their very dissimilar natures. As Magalhães 
& Moral (2008) and Lobo et al (2015) point out, young people in Portugal generally 
display lower levels of political knowledge and sophistication when compared with 
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the general population. This explanation can also be potentially applied to the lack of 
impact on trust in the government. As the participants might be mistaking the 
government’s institutional role in Portugal with the United States presidency. 
 
Figure 5) Effects on trust in political institutions – The West Wing 
 
Notes: Statistically significant results boxed. 
 
Table 17) Effects on trust in political institutions – The West Wing 
  Expected direction Sig. 
Political parties Yes n.s. 
MPs No n.s. 
President of the Republic Yes p=.058 
Government of Portugal Yes n.s. 
Notes:  paired-samples T test was used 
n.s: Not statistically significant 
  
2.38 2.12 2 2.122.42 2.12 2.31 2.19
Political	Parties MPs President	of	the	Republic Government	of	PortugalPretest	mean Posttest	mean
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5.6. Testing Hypothesis 6 (Trust in political institutions – House of Cards) 
The tests on the effect of exposure to House of Cards on levels of trust in 
Portuguese political institutions display no statistically significant results in any of the 
four variables under study (Figure 6; Table 18): trust in political parties, MPs, the 
President of the Republic and the Government of Portugal. Nonetheless, it is 
interesting to note that the House of Cards group displays higher overall levels of 
trust in political institutions than its West Wing counterpart, which can be explained 
by the fact that the House of Cards group leaned more towards the right-wing side 
of the political spectrum and at the time of data collection (between the 26th of May 
2015 and the 28th of July 2015) the party in government in Portugal was in the 
center-right of the spectrum.  
Measuring the effect of being exposed to House of Cards on trust in political 
parties we see no statistically significant impact (t(25)=.319; p=.753). as the sample 
scored 3.54 in the pretest mean and 3.46 in the posttest mean Regarding the effect 
of exposure to House of Cards on trust in MPs, we see no statistically significant 
impact (t(25)=-.895; p=.380);. The same is true when we measure the treatment’s 
effect on trust in the President of the Republic (t(25)=-1250; p=.223), as we observe 
a very modest, negligible  increase from 3.12 in the pretest mean to 3.46 in the 
posttest mean. The trend continues when we measure the effects of exposure to 
House of Cards on trust in the government, with a statistically insignificant increase in 
trust from 3.50 in the pretest mean to 3.62 in the posttest mean (t(25)=-.461; 
p=.649). 
Overall, exposure to House of Cards did not produce any statistically significant 
results on the effect on trust. 
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Figure 6) Effects on trust in political institutions– House of Cards 
 
Notes: Statistically significant results boxed. 
 
Table 18) Effects on trust in political institutions– House of Cards 
  Expected direction Sig. 
Political parties Yes n.s 
MPs No n.s 
President of the Republic No n.s 
Government of Portugal No n.s 
Notes:  paired-samples T test was used 
n.s.: Not statistically significant 
 
5.7. Discussion of the results  
As the literature surveyed in previous chapters points out, there is evidence that 
media exposure to entertainment content has an effect on the political attitudes of 
those exposed to it. In order to test the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 3 an 
experimental design was employed, which produced interesting results.  
3.54 2.69 3.12 3.53.46 2.88 3.46 3.62
Political	Parties MPs President	of	the	Republic Government	of	PortugalPretest	mean Posttest	mean
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Regarding the effect of exposure to the treatment on political efficacy, 
statistically significant results were observed when we tested hypothesis 1 and 2 
(Table 18). We were able to find a relationship between exposure to positive valenced 
framings of politicians and a decrease in agreement that politicians do not care about 
what ordinary people think about politics. In a divergent direction, we established a 
relationship between exposure to negative valenced framings of politicians and both 
an increase in agreement that ordinary citizens do not have any influence in political 
decisions and that particular interests have too much influence on the making of 
public policy. Both this results confirm the literature and partially confirm hypothesis 
1 and 2.  
But the relationship between media exposure and its effects is not as linear as 
Van Zoonen exposes. We also found that exposure to the West Wing decreases the 
perception that normal people are given many opportunities to participate in the 
political process; these findings go in the opposite direction of the hypothesis laid out 
(Table12). This deviation can be explained with recourse to Michelle Mouton’s 
research (2003), which suggests that the show presents a slightly elitist conception of 
politics by presenting politics in a very professionalized manner through which 
“political work can effectively occur” (p. 198). The author also points out that the 
show’s narrow focus on the White House’s backroom and corridors leaves out of the 
series key actors of the political process, such as ordinary citizens, protesters, unions 
and “politically active young women and men who are on the outside of the 
professional class and its predominant discourse” (p. 198). This aspect of the 
television series could explain why it might lead some to see politics as something 
that should be left out to a small minority of extraordinary individuals. We can also 
argue that the show’s focus on character development, as Holbert et al (2003) 
argues, could be framing the political process as something done by individuals 
instead of larger collective identities such as “the people”, “the nation” or, “the 
workers”, and thus could be alienating the participants from the political process, 
which is in line with Mouton (2003). 
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Another explanation pertains to priming effects of the episode which can lead to 
participants being primed into believe that only those politicians who are talented, 
educated, honorable and conscientious enough such as the characters on the show 
can be capable politicians. Thus driving ordinary people such as them out of the 
political process. 
When we tested the effects of exposure to House of Cards on the participant’s 
perceptions that public policy decisions are made in the name of individual interests 
rather than the interests of the population at large, our findings contradict the 
predictions laid out in Chapter 3 since agreement with the sentence decreased. This 
unexpected result can be explained with recourse to the episode’s narrative itself. In 
this episode, the show’s protagonist, the anti-hero Frank Underwood, struggles to rig 
the political process in his favor, despite succeeding in subsequent episodes which 
were not featured in our experiment. Nonetheless this was the weakest statistically 
significant result our study produced. 
 The effects of exposure to the valenced framing of politicians provided by The 
West Wing and House of Cards are less impactful relative to participant’s attitudes 
towards political parties. There was only one statistically significant instance in the 
House of Cards treatment regarding the belief that political parties only contribute to 
divide the people, where an increase in agreement with the statement is observed. 
The weaker impact of exposure to fictional political dramas on attitudes towards 
political parties can be explained by the fact that the political reality portrayed in the 
television series selected for this experiment does not feature instances of party 
politics. Both of them were produced in the United States and the episodes aimed to 
represent the political reality of that country, which is very different form the reality 
that the participants inhabit. The United States polity is far less reliant on political 
parties to mediate the political process when compared to Portugal (Craig 2016). 
Nonetheless, the statistically significant result yielded by the tests performed to test 
hypotheses 3 and 4, can be explained by the specific way House of Cards frames the 
political process in conflict-oriented way, wherein the main characters are driven 
forward in the narrative.  
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 Regarding the effects of exposure on participants’ trust in political institutions, 
the results produced by the testing for hypothesis 5 and 6 followed this trend; impact 
on these variables is negligible, with the partial exception of the West Wing 
treatment which yielded statistically significant results in increased levels of trust in 
the President of the Republic. These results can perhaps be explained in a twofold 
manner. First, the overwhelmingly positive way the President of the United States is 
framed by the television series. The show’s writers go out of their way to portray the 
president as someone who is extremely capable of performing his institutional role. 
President Josiah Bartlet is seen in the episode as a knowledgeable and good-hearted 
man who can out quote biblical scripture to religious fundamentalists. The second 
dimension which helps us explain these results is the well-documented fact that, as 
Azevedo and Menezes (2008), Magalhães and Moral (2008), and Lobo et a (2015) 
point out, young Portuguese people by-and-large have lesser levels of political 
sophistication and knowledge which could lead to participants into misunderstanding 
the institutional differences between the President of the United States and President 
of the Republic in Portugal.  
 Overall, these results help us to partially confirm our initial hypotheses that 




Table 19) Findings 
Hypotheses Confirmation Results 
H1 - Being exposed 
to the West Wing 
has a positive effect 
on political efficacy 
Partially 
confirmed 
No influence in government (p=.644) 
Politicians do not care (p=.017) 
Particular interests have too much influence 
(p=.327) 
Citizens have no opportunity (p=.086) 
H2 - Being exposed 
to House of Cards 
has a negative effect 
on political efficacy. 
Partially 
confirmed 
No influence in government (p=.007) 
Politicians do not care (p=.210) 
Particular interests have too much influence 
(p=.094) 
Citizens have no opportunity (p=.802) 
H3 - Being exposed 
to the West Wing 
has a positive effect 




Political parties are all the same (p=.602) 
Political parties are necessary in democracy 
(p=.816) 
Political parties divide people (p=.709) 
H4 - Being exposed 
to House of Cards 
has a negative effect 




Political parties are all the same (p=.694) 
Political parties are necessary in democracy 
(p=.161) 
Political parties divide people (p=.043) 
H5 - Being exposed 
to the West Wing 
has a positive effect 




Political parties (p=.713) 
MPs (p=1) 
President of the Republic (p=.053) 
Portuguese government (p=.603) 
H6 - Being exposed 
to House of Cards 
has a negative effect 




Political parties (p=.753) 
MPs (p=.380) 
President of the Republic (p=.223) 







We sought out to contribute to the growing body of research on the effects of 
media exposure on political attitudes by challenging ourselves with the question 
“What are the effects of exposure of fictional political dramas on the audience’s 
political attitudes such as political efficacy, attitudes towards political parties and trust 
in political institutions?”  
To better answer our research question we surveyed some of the theories on 
cognitive effects of mass media such as cultivation theory, agenda setting, priming 
and framing. All these theoretical models point out that there is indeed a direct 
relationship between being exposed to media such as television or films and changes 
in the political attitudes of those exposed. These models were then supplemented 
with review of empirical studies on the effects of media on political attitudes that 
could guide our own research. All of which provided clear empirical evidence for the 
existence of these media effects on a wide variety of genres of television including 
traditional satire, reality television, soft news and more importantly fictional political 
dramas. 
It was from the point of view of one standing on the shoulders of those who 
came before that we established our set of six hypotheses, which were tested using 
an experimental design. Given the literature that had been cited before, we expected 
to replicate some of the findings and to confirm our hypotheses. These were partially 
confirmed by the tests we conducted. We observed a relationship between being 
exposed to fictional political dramas and attitude change at the level of political 
efficacy, attitudes towards political parties and trust in political parties, MPs, the 
President of the Republic and the Portuguese Government.  
Hopefully our study will contribute to shed light in a less explored avenue of 
research in Portugal, the relationship between entertainment and politics. Given that 
our sample consisted totally of young adults, our findings can also contribute to 
explain the relationship between young adults and politics. As Magalhães and Moral 
(2008) and Lobo et al (2015) point out, this segment of Portuguese society has its 
own set of specifications, for example, they tend to be dissatisfied with politics, and 
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subsequently have lower levels of political involvement and political party 
membership. They also tend to be less exposed to political information and thus are 
less politically sophisticated. In view of this, by pointing out potential new sources of 
political information that can be more appealing to young adults in Portugal, our 
study can contribute to the inclusion of young adults into the political process. As 
Lobo et al (2015) and Jackson (2009) note, young people tend to think about politics 
and political activism in different ways, so why not have different sources of political 
information? While far from being a consensual issue among political scientists, 
authors such as Van Zoonen (2005) go so far as to argue for the articulation between 
citizenship and entertainment and in favor of a fan democracy. 
Despite the positive results obtained with this experimental design, it is crucial to 
recognize its shortcomings. The most obvious one is that it relies on a small sample of 
only 52 individuals and that they are largely pooled from the same background, i.e. 
university students. As McDermott (2002) points out, university students often have 
more fluid attitudes and identities, and thus it would be interesting to expand this 
type of research with a more diversified sample of the Portuguese population. 
Another shortcoming of the experimental design was its use of political fictional 
dramas produced in the United States and who sought to fictionalize the reality of 
that country’s political process and institutions. It is impossible to tell whether this 
had an impact on how the participants were effected but we can certainly speculate 
that, had the treatment been of fictionalized accounts of Portuguese politics, the 
results might be different. And finally, future experimental designs should seek to 
incorporate other methodologies like observational designs such as longitudinal 
studies in tandem with experimental methodology. These aspects are something that 
should be explored in future research in order to strengthen the external validity of 
the findings.  
 Another avenue for future research is to explore the potential cultivation 
effects of exposure to fictional political dramas. As pointed out by Gerbner (1998), 
cultivation theory presupposes prolonged exposure to mass media stimuli. As such, it 
was impossible to account for such effects in the present experimental design, where 
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we could only look into short-term valenced framing effects. It would be interesting 
to see whether or not these effects on attitude change persist over time. This goes in 
tandem with the argument made by Jackson (2009) earlier in favor of the influence 
of entertainment media and pop culture exposure and its capacity to solidify political 
attitudes. For the author this exposure contributes to political socialization, defined as 
the process whereby individuals obtain political beliefs, values and norms. Taking into 
account the long-term nature of cultivation analysis, future research could pursue this 
avenue, which would undoubtedly produce interesting results and discussion on the 
long-term effects of attitude change and its subsequent solidification produced by 
exposure to fictional political dramas.  
Another option would be to study whether or not fictional political dramas can 
potentially produce agenda setting effects. The episodes which were used in the 
experimental design feature characters and plotlines revolving around important 
public policy issues such as education reform in House of Cards, and the plight of 
Cuban refugees seeking asylum in the United States in The West Wing. Which could 
potentially set the agenda for these issues. Nonetheless, it was only a single episode 
and as such these topics were not given the necessary attention to create the 
required degree of awareness to set the agenda. As Strange and Leung (1999) point 
out, there is evidence that both information based sources as well as fictional ones 
have agenda-setting properties. Still, it is easy to put forward a scenario whereby a 
new popular television series emerges on the media landscape, which centers itself 
on issues such as LGBT rights, environmental awareness or the plight of the refugees, 
and subsequently brings attention to its chosen topic. Klein (2011) argues in favor for 
televisions’ potential rule as a pedagogical tool on a variety of social issues. Can such 
as television show set the agenda for public policy by casting a dramatic light on a 
controversial issue? This is could be a vehicle for future research. 
 Is it possible to extract any normative conclusions from these findings? If we 
follow the explanation given above for hypothesis 5, that participants have mistaken 
the institutionally distinct roles of the President of the Republic and the United States 
President, then it follows that more attention and investment should be spent on 
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civics education in Portugal. As Azevedo and Menezes (2008), point out, young 
people’s education in the field of politics and citizenship have a positive effect on 
levels of political and civic participation later in life. 
 The current research is breaking new ground in Portuguese political research, 
as such it is bound to be incomplete, contingent and flawed. Nonetheless, our 
findings must be taken into consideration and placed in the context of the overall 
scholarship dedicated to analyzing the intersection between politics and the media. 
The present research is but a small piece of the puzzle. We urge that our study be 
replicated with similar or even more ambitious research designs, treatments and 
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